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FOREWORD
The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) has maintained
close and positive professional ties with our colleagues
at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) in
Washington, DC, since ACSS’s founding in 1999. The
Africa Center is the preeminent U.S. Department of
Defense (DoD) institution for strategic security studies, research, and outreach in Africa.
I am pleased that SSI and ACSS are once more able
to collaborate in the publication of this monograph,
entitled AFRICOM at 5 Years: The Maturation of a New
U.S. Combatant Command. Its author, David E. Brown,
is currently the Senior Diplomatic Advisor at ACSS.
He brings unique perspectives to the important national security and foreign policy issue of the creation
and maturation of the new U.S. Africa Command
(AFRICOM). Mr. Brown is a U.S. diplomat intimately
familiar with the increased, post-September 11, 2001
(9/11), engagement of the U.S. military in Africa, having served as Deputy Chief of Mission at three U.S.
Embassies in Africa over much of the past 12 years
in Cotonou, Benin; Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; and
Nouakchott, Mauritania. Just prior to joining ACSS
in 2011, Mr. Brown also served in AFRICOM itself
in Stuttgart, Germany, as a Senior Advisor to the J-5
Director responsible for policy, plans, and programs.
The author, a Senior Foreign Service Officer of the U.S.
Department of State (DoS), has thus been a close and
privileged observer of AFRICOM as both an insider
and outsider.
Mr. Brown’s Letort Paper describes how AFRICOM has matured greatly over the past 5 years,
overcome much of the initial resistance from African
stakeholders through a consistent public affairs mes-
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sage emphasizing AFRICOM’s capacity building of civilian-led African militaries, and addressed most U.S.
interagency concerns about the Command’s size and
proper role within the U.S. national security/foreign
policy community by adopting whole-of-government
approaches, including integrating a large interagency
team at its headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. This
Paper explains the Command’s creation in terms of
geostrategic, operational, and intellectual changes
since the 1990s, including the rise, particularly post9/11, of nonstate actors in Africa—terrorists and criminals—who presented asymmetric threats.
Mr. Brown concludes this Letort Paper by: 1) debunking three myths about AFRICOM: that it was
created to exploit Africa’s oil and gas riches, that it
blocks China’s rise in Africa, and that France opposes AFRICOM; and, 2) raising five issues important
to AFRICOM’s future: allocated forces, the selection
of the Command’s partner nations, the desirability
of regional approaches in Africa, the location of the
Command’s headquarters, and the need for a strategic
right-sizing of the Command.
SSI is pleased to offer this monograph in fulfillment of its mission to assist U.S. Army and DoD senior leaders and strategic thinkers in understanding
the key issues of the day.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), the newest of the six U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) geographic combatant commands (CCMDs), was created in 2007 amid great controversy in both Africa
and the United States over its location and mission.
Over the last 5 years, AFRICOM has matured greatly,
overcome much of the initial resistance from African
stakeholders, and addressed most U.S. interagency
concerns about the Command’s size and proper
role within the U.S. national security/foreign policy
community. AFRICOM is a CCMD Plus, because it
also has: 1) a broader soft power mandate aimed at
building a stable security environment; and, 2) a relatively larger personnel contingent from other U.S.
Government agencies.
This Letort Paper is divided into five parts. Part
I notes that, during the Cold War, Africa remained a
low-security priority for the United States, but that
from the 1990s to 2007, there were geostrategic, operational, and intellectual changes that explain why
AFRICOM was eventually created and how it was
structured. Two key geopolitical changes were: 1) the
rise, particularly post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), of
nonstate actors in Africa—terrorists and criminals—
who presented asymmetric threats; and, 2) the continent’s growing economic importance in the world,
both as a source of strategic natural resources and
increasingly as a market. Two important operational
reasons behind AFRICOM’s creation were that: 1) the
U.S. Central and European Commands had become
overstretched by the mid-2000s fighting and supporting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; and, 2) crises in
Africa had revealed seams between Commands’
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boundaries that needed to be closed. There were
also four intellectual changes in geopolitical thinking that shaped how AFRICOM was structured:
an increased recognition of the interdependence
of security and development, a new emphasis
on conflict prevention and stability operations
vice warfighting, the emergence of the broader
concept of human security and the related responsibility to protect (R2P); and the growing need for new
jointness, or whole-of-government approaches to
interagency cooperation.
Part II explains how this fourth intellectual
change—the growing need for a new jointness in interagency cooperation—is critical to the improved integration of the U.S. national security/foreign policy
community. The author advocates that Congress pass
new Goldwater-Nichols-type legislation, including
provisions upgrading the role for the top interagency
representative at all geographic CCMDs, requiring assignments at other agencies for promotion into the senior ranks, modifying civil service rules to allow more
service at other agencies, and outlining principles for
cost-sharing between agencies to facilitate exchanges
of personnel.
Part III illustrates how AFRICOM has matured
greatly over the past 5 years. AFRICOM got off to a
rocky beginning in 2007, when DoD, the U.S. Department of State (DoS), and the White House mishandled the Command’s start-up, to include proposing
that its headquarters be relocated to Africa—a move
thoroughly rejected by the large majority of African
governments. However, AFRICOM has slowly recovered through a consistent public affairs message
articulated by its top leadership, which emphasized
the Command’s capacity for building civilian-led Af-
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rican militaries. The Command also got off to a slow
start in its internal planning and assessment processes
and loosely prioritized tens of millions of dollars in
engagement expenditures from 2007-10. However,
AFRICOM is now better at integrating this work with
the DoD planning cycles in Washington and with U.S.
Embassy strategic plans in Africa, including a muchimproved annual planning cycle that touches senior
interagency officials at multiple points.
Part IV points out that the AFRICOM-led military
operation initiated in Libya in 2011, as well as reports
of expanded intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in the Sahel and Horn of Africa over the last 2
years, have given the Command more of a military
operations complexion than initially anticipated, creating both new controversy and support among African and U.S. stakeholders. At the same time, the
Command has had considerable success in blunting
criticism that it was “militarizing” U.S. foreign policy
toward Africa. Factors behind this success include:
AFRICOM’s mainly positive track record of seeking
close cooperation with the interagency, AFRICOM’s
relatively modest “development” projects focused on
HIV/AIDS in the military, and its continued primary
focus on sustained long-term capacity building with
African militaries. Part IV also debunks three myths
about AFRICOM: that it was created to exploit Africa’s
oil and gas riches, that it blocks China’s rise in Africa,
and that France opposes AFRICOM.
In Part V, the author concludes by raising five issues important to AFRICOM’s future: 1) allocated
forces to carry out short-term training engagements in
Africa; 2) giving preference to emerging democracies
in the selection of the Command’s partner-nations; 3)
the desirability of regional approaches in Africa, in-
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cluding helping the African Union and its Regional
Economic Communities to establish standby brigades;
4) the location of the Command’s headquarters, which
should remain in Stuttgart, Germany, for now for operational efficiency; and, 5) the need at a time of severe
budget constraints and a real risk for the United States
of strategic insolvency to carry out a top-down rightsizing exercise at AFRICOM, including careful examination of its investments in intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance assets.
Four background addenda follow this report.
They introduce the three major terrorism groupings in
Africa, describe several of AFRICOM’s security cooperation programs, present AFRICOM’s Mission Statement and Commander’s Intent, and provide examples
of continued African opposition to AFRICOM in the
print media.

x

AFRICOM AT 5 YEARS:
THE MATURATION OF A
NEW U.S. COMBATANT COMMAND
We must start from the simple premise that Africa’s
future is up to Africans. . . . We welcome the steps
that are being taken by organizations like the African
Union. [At the same time,] when there’s a genocide in
Darfur or terrorists in Somalia, these are not simply
African problems—they are global security challenges, and they demand a global response. . . . And let me
be clear: Our Africa Command is focused not on establishing a foothold in the continent, but on confronting
these common challenges to advance the security of
the America, Africa, and the world.
		
		

Remarks by U.S. President Barack Obama
to Ghana’s Parliament,
July 11, 2009

INTRODUCTION
At the time of President Obama’s 2009 Africa policy speech quoted above, the U.S. Africa Command
(AFRICOM) had existed as a combatant command
for less than 2 years, and had come under sharp criticism since its inception, both in Africa and the United
States. In this context, Obama felt compelled as Commander-in-Chief to affirm before an African audience
his strong support for AFRICOM’s mission of promoting greater security in Africa. Three years later,
as AFRICOM passed the milestone of its 5th anniversary, and as a new U.S. administration enters 2013 in
a period of far tighter budgets, it is timely to reflect on
this Command’s creation, its evolving role in the interagency process, its reception in Africa, and the way
it might accomplish its mission in the future in a more
1

cost-effective, policy-relevant way. To address these
issues, this Letort Paper is divided into five parts.
Part I examines the posture of AFRICOM’s headquarters and components, and the historical context
leading to the Command’s creation in 2007. Part II
focuses on AFRICOM’s unique interagency team and
makes policy recommendations for new GoldwaterNichols-type legislation to promote what this author
calls new jointness in interagency cooperation. Part
III answers the questions of whether AFRICOM has
undermined the U.S. Department of State (DoS) interagency lead and militarized U.S. foreign policy,
engaged in development work appropriately, and
worked well in interagency coordination and strategic
planning. Part IV examines the important issue of African attitudes toward AFRICOM, and analyzes three
damaging, yet perennial, myths about AFRICOM
involving Africa’s energy resources, China’s rise in
Africa, and France’s views of AFRICOM. Finally, Part
V examines AFRICOM’s future, including the significance of the Command’s new allocated forces; whether the U.S. Government can ally more selectively with
African democratic leaders; how AFRICOM could
strengthen African regional approaches to security;
where the Command’s headquarters should be located; and why the threat of U.S. strategic insolvency
means AFRICOM must right-size, including examining carefully its investments in intelligence assets.
Some readers may question the first part of this Paper’s title, “AFRICOM at 5 Years,” pointing out that
the Command reached full operating capability only
in October 2008—i.e., less than 5 years ago. In AFRICOM’s case, the milestone of 5 years is a useful literary hook, however, and AFRICOM did achieve initial
operating capacity under the U.S. European Com-
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mand in October 2007. Moreover, the lore of AFRICOM’s bureaucratic birth also suggests a 5-year mark.
According to a senior George W. Bush administration
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) official responsible
for Africa, AFRICOM was conceived in the summer of
2006, when then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfield ordered a study of a future U.S. Africa Command over the strong objections of senior military
officials in the U.S. European Command. Whatever
the real background behind AFRICOM’s creation,
this Paper describes how the Command has grown
and matured greatly since 2007 into an active, geographic combatant command responsible for an area
of the world—the vast African continent—with some
of the most important and challenging issues for U.S.
national security.
PART I - AFRICOM: HISTORICAL CONTEXT
OF ITS CREATION AND CURRENT POSTURE
U.S. Perceptions of Africa’s Geostrategic
Importance before AFRICOM’s Creation.
Reflecting the end of World War II and the startup of the Cold War, the two earliest, still existing,
geographic combatant commands are the U.S. European Command and the U.S. Pacific Command,
which were created in 1947.1 The DoS established its
Africa Bureau in 1958, signaling the importance that
the United States placed on political relations with a
growing number of independent African countries.2
By contrast, the DoD cartography of Africa was dictated by Cold War geopolitics. During the Cold War,
Africa remained a low military/security priority for
the United States, despite the numerous proxy wars
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Washington was tacitly or directly supporting on
the continent.345 Africa was not even included in the
U.S. military command structure until 1952, when
several North African countries were added to the
European Command.6 In 1983, responsibility for Africa was divided between the European, Central, and
Pacific Commands7—a structure that persisted until
AFRICOM’s creation in 2007.
After the end of the Cold War, U.S. military policymakers saw little need to court African leaders.8
DoD’s 1995 U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan
Africa, for example, concluded that “ultimately we
see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa.”9
The 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, were an inflection
point toward greater U.S. strategic interest in Africa.
In 1999, DoD opened the African Center for Security
Studies to support the development of U.S. strategic
policy toward Africa—a move that could be seen as a
precursor to its creation of AFRICOM in 2007.10 DoD
recognized that establishing a regional center dedicated to Africa made sense, given the continent’s rising importance, but could not yet justify a much larger proposition—a geographic combatant command
(CCMD) for Africa.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11),
also marked a turning point in U.S. strategic policy
toward Africa. The events of 9/11 forced a reassessment of and placed greater attention on the presence
of extremists on the continent.11 One result was the
creation of the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn
of Africa in 2002, ostensibly to capture Islamic fighters fleeing from Afghanistan and the Middle East. In
2003, an academic had called for the creation of “U.S.
Forces Africa,” but his proposal was not accepted by
the U.S. Government.12
4

Around the mid-2000s, the U.S. Government
reached a tipping point in its views of Africa’s significance. For example, in its March 2006 U.S. National
Security Strategy, the Bush administration concluded
that “Africa [held] growing geostrategic importance
and [had become] a high priority.”13 In congressional
testimony that same month, Commander General John
P. Abizaid of Central Command stated that he viewed
the Horn of Africa as “vulnerable to penetration by
regional extremist groups, terrorist activity, and ethnic violence.” General James L. Jones of the European
Command pointed out in 2006 that his Command’s
staff was spending more than half its time on African
issues, up from almost no time 3 years earlier. That
same year, General Bantz Craddock, Jones’s successor, stated that Africa in recent years had posed “the
greatest security stability challenge” to [the U.S. European Command] and “a separate command for Africa
would provide better focus and increase synergy in
support of U.S. policy and engagement.”14
Consistent with the advice of General Craddock,
President Bush decided in 2007 to create AFRICOM.15
AFRICOM’s creation also marked the disappearance
of the one of the U.S. Government’s last organizational vestiges of the colonial period and Cold War in that
U.S.-Africa security relations were no longer subordinated to the European Command.
In a November 21, 2012, speech at Chatham
House in London, United Kingdom (UK), AFRICOM
Commander General Carter Ham made informal comments that reflected the above timeline:
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Africa, to be completely honest, is not a part of the
world that the United States military has focused on
very intently until recently. We have had previously
only a very small number of U.S. military intelligence
analysts who focused on Africa and an extraordinary
but small community of attachés with repetitive assignments and experiences on the African continent. . . .
That changed in the mid-2000s. And I think amidst
military engagement in other parts of the world, there
was a growing recognition in the United States that
Africa was increasingly important to the United States
in a number of areas, certainly economically but politically and diplomatically as well from a development
standpoint and also from a security standpoint. So in
the mid-2000s there was a decision to establish the
United States military command that was exclusively
focused on the African continent.16

Factors Leading to and Shaping AFRICOM’s
Creation in 2007.
In the above section, we presented a historical
timeline leading to AFRICOM’s creation. While useful, this timeline lacks a deeper explanation of the historical context and intellectual changes that were also
important to AFRICOM’s creation, shaping, and core
raison d’être. In this section, the author argues that in
the 1990s and 2000s, there were two kinds of changes—geostrategic and operational—that explain why
AFRICOM was created, and another kind of change—
intellectual—that shaped how it was created:
Geostrategic.
The two major geostrategic factors behind AFRICOM’s creation in 2007 were:
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1. The Rise of Nonstate Actors in Africa: Terrorists
and Criminals. Of primary importance was the rise
in the 1990s in Africa of two kinds of nonstate actors:
Violent Extremist Organizations and illicit traffickers.
Box 1 below presents background on the rise in the
1990s of three terrorist organizations in Africa. By the
mid-2000s, African countries were also facing asymmetric threats from well-funded criminal cartels—for
which there is also an increasing nexus with terrorist
organizations—engaged in illicit trafficking in drugs,
arms, counterfeit goods, people, endangered animals;
piracy; oil theft; illegal fishing, and illegal dumping of
waste on land and at sea. One striking example was
the emergence starting in 2005 of large-scale cocaine
trafficking through West Africa to Europe carried out
by the same Latin American cartels who sold their
drugs in North America.
We argued above that the more important of two major geostrategic factors behind AFRICOM’s creation
in 2007 was the rise of two nonstate actors: terrorists
and criminals. For background, we discuss here three
examples of emerging terrorism threats in Africa that
existed at the time of AFRICOM’s founding to make a
case that the geostrategic threat of terrorism was a valid justification for AFRICOM’s creation in 2007 (and
arguably an even stronger case for the Command’s
continued existence today):17
1. Al-Qaeda’s Links to Africa, U.S. Embassy Bombings. Al-Qaeda was formed in August 1988 by several
leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who agreed to
join with Saudi Arabia national Osama bin Laden in
their fight against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
After condemning the Saudi government for its alliance with the United States following Iraqi dictator
Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Riyadh
forced bin Laden into exile in Sudan from 1991 to 1996.

Box 1. Three Major Terrorism Groupings
in Africa Starting in the 1990s.
7

In 1996, the U.S. DoS accused Sudan of being a “sponsor of international terrorism,” and bin Laden himself
of operating “terrorist training camps in the Sudanese
desert.” Even though bin Laden left for Afghanistan
later that year under pressure from the United States
and Saudi Arabia, he had already aided al-Qaedatrained terrorists and affiliates to set up shop in other
parts of Africa.18 For example, al-Qaeda-affiliated operatives were behind the 1998 bombings of the U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
2. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This
al-Qaeda affiliate was known until 2007 as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. The group began in 1997 as a splinter faction of the Armed Islamic
Group, which itself had fought a bloody insurgency
against the Algerian military government with the
help of Algerian mujahedeen fighters returning from
Afghanistan. The group came to prominence in 2003
with the spectacular kidnapping of 32 European tourists, using a kidnap-for-ransom tactic that the group
has since used repeatedly to generate large revenues
for operations. Although this al-Qaeda affiliate has its
origins in Algeria and was co-founded by Algerian
jihadists returning from Afghanistan, it now poses a
serious threat to multiple countries in the Sahel, from
Mauritania to Mali, Niger, and Chad.19 In March 2012,
the group took over the northern half of Mali with
Touareg allies in the chaos following a coup d’état.
The group has become particularly dangerous since
reportedly acquiring surface-to-air missiles during
the chaos following the fall of Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi, from whose regime it also recruited mercenary
soldiers as new jihadist fighters.
3. Al-Shabaab in Somalia. According to a November 2012 Africa Center for Strategic Studies brief, “Islamic militancy in Somalia first surfaced in the mid-1980s
with the formation of al Itihad al Islamia (“Islamic Unity”),
which expanded it military operations in the early 1990s.”20

Box 1. Three Major Terrorism Groupings
in Africa Starting in the 1990s. (cont.)
8

Al Itihad seemed to disappear after 1996, but influenced the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) that emerged
in the mid-2000s. In 2006, in the months leading up to
AFRICOM’s founding, Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia and defeated the ICU, which had taken control
of parts of Somalia.21 The ICU’s military wing splintered off that year and launched an insurgency under
the name of al-Shabaab.22 It eventually gained control
of most of the southern part of Somalia, where it imposed its own strict form of Sharia law.
In February 2012, al-Shabaab officially pledged
loyalty to al-Qaeda.23 (It was already considered by the
United States to be an al-Qaeda affiliate, and had been
designated in 2008 as a foreign terrorist organization.)
Al-Shabaab controlled the majority of Somali territory until the summer and fall of 2012, when fighters
of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),
backed by Ethiopian and Kenya forces, drove it out of
Mogadishu, Kismayo, and largely into the bush. Prior
to this, al-Shabaab had attacked ships and ransomed
their crews as a way to finance its operations. This created a piracy crisis in the entire Horn of Africa down
to the Mozambique Channel—an area that would
have overlapped the old areas of responsibility of the
European, Central, and Pacific Commands.24

Box 1. Three Major Terrorism Groupings
in Africa Starting in the 1990s. (cont.)
2. Africa’s Growing Economic Importance. Of secondary importance to terrorist concerns was Africa’s
growing economic importance in the world, both as
a source of strategic natural resources, including oil,
gas, and minerals, and increasingly as a market. By
2007, Angola and Nigeria had already become important suppliers of oil to the United States, and projections pointed toward the Gulf of Guinea region as a
growing major source of U.S. energy imports.25
9

Today, it may seem obvious, ex post facto, that a
separate U.S. geographic combatant command should
have been created for Africa in recognition not only
of the continent’s growing strategic importance, but
of its position straddling Europe, the Arabian Peninsula, and the global shipping lanes of East and West
Africa, where piracy and illicit trafficking at sea have
emerged as major problems. As AFRICOM’s J-5 Director, Major General Charles Hooper, recently framed it:
Djibouti, on the Horn of Africa, is a mere 20 miles
across the Bab el-Mandeb waterway from Yemen and
the Arabian Peninsula. Similarly, the eastern coastline
of Africa is also the western shore of the Indian Ocean,
sitting astride the sea lines of communication that link
the continent and Europe to the rising powers of the
Asia-Pacific region. In the north, Tunisia is less than 70
miles from Sicily, and only the Strait of Gibraltar separates Spain from Morocco . . . . [The] Gulf of Guinea [in
West Africa is] a region important not only to Africa
but increasingly to the United States as well.26

Operational.
There were also two important operational imperatives behind the creation of AFRICOM:
1. Existing Combatant Commands Were Overstretched, Distracted. The European and Central Commands had become overstretched by the mid-2000s,
particularly given the wars in Iraq and Aghanistan.
The European Command was primarily focused on
relations with European allies and Russia, while the
Pacific Command was primarily focused on China, India, and North Korea.27 (As earlier comments by Generals Jones and Craddock suggest, the European Com-
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mand also highlighted the ever-growing importance
of its Africa engagement, in part to display continued
relevance in the era of the Global War on Terror.)
2. Closing Seams. Crises in Africa had revealed
“seams” between the Commands’ boundaries that
needed to be closed. For example, one seam was located
between Sudan (then within the Central Command’s
area of responsibility), Chad, and the Central African
Republic (then within the European Command’s area
of responsibility). This was an area of chronic instability
with regard to the situation in Darfur and occasionally
with regard to the Lord’s Resistance Army. Another
seam was caused by the fact that most countries in Africa were within the European Command’s responsibility, but the headquarters of the African Union (AU)
were in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, which was within
the Central Command’s responsibility. (In this sense,
AFRICOM can be viewed as an internal reorganization of DoD’s combatant command structure to rationalize lines of authority.28)
Intellectual Changes in Thinking about
Geopolitics Shaped AFRICOM.
Beyond these geostrategic and operational reasons why AFRICOM was founded are four important
intellectual changes in thinking about geopolitics in
the 1990s and 2000s that also shaped how AFRICOM
was created and structured. While AFRICOM was
perceived externally by some as an act of military
hubris internal to the U.S. defense community, it was
deeply influenced by a sober realization of the limits
of military capability without close coordination with
other elements of national power. The following four
intellectual changes were also key in how AFRICOM
was created:
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1. Intertwined Security and Development. After
the end of the Cold War, donor states realized that if
the security sector disregarded the rule of law, democratic principles, and sound management practices,
sustainable, poverty-reducing development would be
nearly impossible to achieve.29 In Africa, security challenges are inextricably bound up with the challenges
of development, and contributions to solve each are
mutually reinforcing.30
2. Emphasis on Conflict Prevention/Stability Operations, Vice Conduct of War. In conventional U.S.
military doctrine, there are four phases of a military
campaign: 1) deter/engage; 2) seize initiative; 3) decisive operations; and, 4) transition.31 While U.S. armed
forces have traditionally focused on “fighting and winning wars,” military thinkers introduced in the 1990s
an additional phase, “Phase Zero (0),” which focuses
on conflict prevention through increased emphasis on
theater security cooperation and building the capacity
of allies.32 Similarly, another key lesson is that Phase
4, “transition” or “stability operations,” may eclipse
combat operations when determining victory.33 Increasingly the ability of Africans to prevent, mitigate,
and resolve conflicts leads to increases in stability and
thus development.34 In 2005, DoD recognized “stability operations” as a “core U.S. military mission” that
ought to “be given priority comparable to combat operations.”35 (DoD also emphasized building the capacity of partner states in its Quadrennial Defense Review.)36
3. Human Security and the “Responsibility to Protect.” Human security is a post-Cold War paradigm
that has reshaped the traditional notion of national
security by arguing that a people-centered view of security is necessary for national, regional, and global
stability.37 Responsibility to Protect is a corollary concept, endorsed by the United Nations (UN) in 2005,
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based on the idea that sovereignty is not a right, but a
responsibility. This concept focuses on the prevention
of four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.38 The
influence that Responsibility to Protect has had on
AFRICOM is directly observable in the Commander’s
Intent statement in Box 2, where the Command’s top
military officer, General Ham, included a specific reference to the prevention of mass atrocities.39
As we consider AFRICOM’s brief history and the context in which it was created, it is also useful to consider
its current mission. In his November 2012 Chatham
House talk cited above, General Ham also laid out
AFRICOM’s top five priorities in the context of overall
U.S. defense strategy:
A . . . document I suspect many of you have read is
. . . the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance . . . When
the document was released, I had the opportunity
to talk with many of my African counterparts, both
military and civilian, and frankly they were concerned because when you read that document, you
will see that the word “Africa” appears precisely one
time. And so our African partners say—looked at
that and say, does this mean that you no longer care
about Africa?
And I said . . . rather than think that the number of times the word appears is important, look at
the tasks that are outlined in that document for the
United States armed forces and see what you think
about the relevance of Africa then. Unsurprisingly,
at the top of the list for tasks for the United States
armed forces is the defeat of al-Qaida, its associated
networks and to prevent further attacks on America,
Americans and American interests. That’s not sur-

Box 2. AFRICOM’s Mission and
Commander’s Intent.
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prising to you. The sad fact is we do a lot of that
work in Africa today. We want to work to a point
where we don’t have to do as much work. Secondly,
there’s a lot of discussion in the document about the
necessity for continued strategic access to the global
commons for economic growth, to allow free access
globally to markets and for the global economy to
continue to prosper. Certainly we do a lot of that
work in Africa. A third priority is building—what
we call building partner capacity [or] strengthening
the defense capabilities of allied and partner nations,
so that they can first of all deter conflict; so that the
commitment of military forces, whether they be U.S.
or other, is less and less likely. We think that’s a high
priority, and we certainly do that in Africa as well.
An increasingly important priority for the United
States military is the prevention and response to
mass atrocity. Sadly, Africa has had this experience,
and we work carefully with our African partners in
that area as well. And lastly, the United States military is expected to be prepared to assist others with
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, wherever that may occur. And of course that’s certainly
work that is conducted in Africa as well.

AFRICOM’s latest mission statement indicates how
the Command puts U.S. national interests first, while
also helping Africa. It also indirectly frames the issue
of fighting violent extremist organizations and terrorism in terms of defeating “transnational threats”
(which can also include illicit trafficking in drugs, stolen oil, arms, and people, as well as pandemic threats
such as HIV/AIDS and avian influenza):
[AFRICOM] protects and defends the national
security interests of the United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states
and regional organizations and, when directed,
conducts military operations, in order to deter

Box 2. AFRICOM’s Mission and
Commander’s Intent. (cont.)
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and defeat transnational threats and to provide a
security environment conducive to good governance
and development.40

Similarly, the Commander’s Intent, which is typically a subordinated but more detailed and unclassified guidance to members of the Command, indicates
that AFRICOM’s activities, plans, and operations are
centered on two guiding principles. These principles
frame AFRICOM’s activities not in terms of interfering
with the internal affairs of African nations, but rather
in working together to promote Africa’s stability. Put
differently, AFRICOM wishes to “lead from behind”
and let African partners address their own security
challenges with U.S. assistance:
A safe, secure, and stable Africa is in our national interest. Over the long run, it will be Africans who
will best be able to address African security challenges and that AFRICOM most effectively advances
U.S. security interests through focused security engagement with our African partners.41

General Ham elaborated on his internal but unclassified guidance, Commander’s Intent, in an August 2011
address to Command staff. His following elaboration
of the Command’s priorities speaks to both fighting
terrorism as the most important geostrategic reason
for AFRICOM’s creation and to the issues of helping
African nations promote democracy, peace and stability, and prevent mass atrocities (including genocide):
• Deter or defeat al-Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations operating in Africa and
deny them safe haven.
— Strengthen the defense capabilities of key African states and regional partners. Through enduring and tailored engagement, help them
build defense institutions and military forces

Box 2. AFRICOM’s Mission and
Commander’s Intent. (cont.)
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that are capable, sustainable, subordinate to
civilian authority, respectful of the rule of
law, and committed to the well-being of their
fellow citizens. Increase the capacity of key
states to contribute to regional and international military activities aimed at preserving
peace and combating transnational threats to
security.
— Ensure U.S. access to and through Africa in
support of global requirements.
— Be prepared, as part of a whole-of-government approach, to help protect Africans
from mass atrocities. The most effective way
in which we do this is through our sustained
engagement with African militaries.
— When directed, provide military support to
humanitarian assistance efforts.42

Box 2. AFRICOM’s Mission and
Commander’s Intent. (cont.)
4. “New Jointness,”“Whole of Government,”and
“3D” Interagency Cooperation. Based in part on “lessons learned” slowly in the Balkans in the 1990s and
repeated in Iraq and Afghanistan in the early-2000s,
DoD embraced counterinsurgency strategies in the
mid-2000s that recognized the need for a new jointness
or whole-of-government approaches toward meeting
national security objectives. DoD has also embraced
a subset of new jointness or whole-of-government,
known as the 3D approach to security. This approach
recognizes the role of diplomacy, led by the DoS, and
that of development, led by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), alongside defense in
predicting and preventing conflict. DoD issued Joint
Publication 3-08 in 2006 to provide guidance to facilitate coordination between the DoD and interagency
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organizations.43 The 2008 U.S. National Defense Strategy also stressed the military’s commitment to these
two new concepts.44
AFRICOM’s Posture Today: Headquarters
and Components.
What, exactly, is the U.S. AFRICOM? It is the
newest of the six DoD geographic combatant commands.45 Table 1 shows how these six combatant commands divide the globe into their respective areas
of responsibility:

Source: U.S. Government
presentation of DoD data.

Accountability

Office

(GAO)

Table 1. U.S. Combatant Commands’ Areas of
Responsibilities as of October 1, 2008.
Table 2 shows the areas of responsibility and examples of activities transferred to AFRICOM in 2007
from these three other combatant commands.46
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Table 2. Areas of Responsibility and Examples of
Activities Transferred to AFRICOM from Other
Combatant Commands as of October 1, 2008.
As its name suggests, AFRICOM is responsible for
all DoD operations, exercises, and security cooperation in 54 of 55 nations on the African continent, its
island nations, and surrounding waters.47 The single
exception has been Egypt, which, because of that nation’s strong ties to the rest of the Middle East, has
remained part of the Central Command.48 As of the
end of fiscal year (FY) 2012, AFRICOM had approximately 2,300 assigned personnel, including U.S. military, civilian, and contractor employees. About 1,500
personnel work at the command’s headquarters at
Kelly Barracks in Stuttgart. Others are assigned to
AFRICOM units at MacDill Air Force Base near Tampa, Florida, and the Joint Analysis Center in Moles-
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worth, England. AFRICOM’s service component
commands and theater Special Operations Command
component are:
•	U.S. Army Africa: Operating from Vicenza, Italy, it conducts sustained security engagements
with African land forces to promote security,
stability, and peace. 1,600 personnel.49
•	
U.S. Naval Forces Africa: Headquartered in
Naples, Italy, its primary mission is to improve
the maritime security capability and capacity
of African partners. Personnel are shared with
U.S. Naval Forces Europe. 900 personnel.
•	U.S. Air Force Africa: Based at Ramstein Air
Force Base, Germany, it conducts sustained security engagement and operations to promote
air safety, security, and development in Africa.
954 personnel.
•	U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa: Located in
Stuttgart, it conducts operations, exercises,
training, and security cooperation activities throughout the African continent. Staff is
shared with the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe. 319 personnel.
•	Special Operations Command Africa: A theater
Special Operations Command component, Special Operations Command Africa is co-located
at AFRICOM’s headquarters in Stuttgart. 600
personnel.
•	Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa: Located at Camp Lemonnier, a Forward Operating Site in Djibouti with approximately 2,000
personnel (400 staff and 1,600 forces).50 Camp
Lemonnier can also be considered AFRICOM’s
only base on the African continent.51
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AFRICOM’s other forward operating site besides
Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa is on
UK’s Ascension Island in the south Atlantic. It also has
Cooperative Security Locations in Algeria, Botswana,
Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Namibia, Sao Tome and
Principe, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia. 52
The location of AFRICOM, its service components,
and its theater Special Operations Command component are shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Locations of AFRICOM Headquarters
and Its Components.
AFRICOM estimates that the U.S. military footprint on the continent (exclusive of Egypt) averaged
approximately 3,500 troops in 2010. This includes the
personnel at Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa and the rotational presence of forces participating in various exercises, such as the annual commu-
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nications interoperability exercise African Endeavor;
operations such as JUNIPER SHIELD;53 theater security cooperation activities such as the Navy’s Africa Partnership Station; and various conferences
and meetings.54
PART II - AFRICOM AND THE NEW JOINTNESS
OF INTERAGENCY COOPERATION
The fourth intellectual change noted above that affected how AFRICOM was formed—the growing need
for new jointness or whole-of-government in interagency cooperation—is also a useful segue into a discussion of the interagency team at AFRICOM compared
to two other geographic combatant commands—the
Southern and Pacific Commands.55 AFRICOM has
commonly been referred to as a “CCMD Plus,” because it has all the roles and responsibilities of a traditional geographic combatant command, but also a:
1) broader “soft power” mandate aimed at building
a stable security environment; and, 2) a relatively
larger contingent of personnel from other U.S. government agencies, including a civilian Deputy Commander for Civil-Military Affairs to carry out this soft
power mandate.56
While AFRICOM may be the first combatant command to be labeled as a CCMD Plus, in recent years
all geographic combatant commands have been placing increased emphasis on soft power and improved
interagency coordination. The way AFRICOM has
gone about it, however, has been unique. Before AFRICOM’s creation in 2007, DoD officials testified that,
to better synchronize military efforts with other U.S.
Government agencies, they intended that AFRICOM’s
headquarters be staffed three-quarters from DoD
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civilians and military, and one-quarter from other U.S.
Government agencies.57 However, despite DoD’s good
intentions, budget realities at other agencies and a lack
of available personnel kept AFRICOM from coming
even close to achieving this initial vision.58 At its peak
in 2011, the Command had only 38 interagency representatives—less than 2 percent of headquarters staff,
and less than one-tenth of the original 25 percent goal.
After a dramatic lowering of its initial expectations,
AFRICOM currently has a new goal of 53 interagency positions within the command structure beyond
those—such as Foreign Policy Advisors—traditionally
assigned to combatant commands.59 This would imply
interagency staffing of roughly 3 percent. Given the
extremely tight budgetary climate expected for FY2013
and beyond, however, even this new goal is unlikely
to be attained under AFRICOM’s current Memoranda
of Understanding with other agencies, which have
been reluctant to send more personnel to AFRICOM.
Some, including the Treasury Department, have even
looked seriously about cutting back on their existing
personnel in Stuttgart.60 Indeed, AFRICOM’s interagency staffing numbers are likely to fall in the future
unless the Command agrees to cost-sharing with partner agencies, particularly for embedded personnel. In
this regard, it would be useful, should Congress take
up new Goldwater-Nichols-type legislation to promote new jointness, that any new law specifically include guidance or principles for cost sharing between
combatant commands and other agencies for salary,
cost of living, housing, and moving expenses.61
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Interagency Team within AFRICOM.
Aside from the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities and the Foreign Policy Advisor,
the DoS augments the AFRICOM headquarters with
11 other personnel spread between the:
•	J-3 (Operations), where a Foreign Service Specialist from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security
works;62
•	J-5 (Strategy, Plans, and Program), where seven
Foreign Service Officers (FSOs), including a
senior (FS-1 or O-6 equivalent) advisor to the
J-5 Director, sit in the J-5 front office.63 In addition, there is one action officer each in the five
Regional Engagement Branches (North, East,
South, Central, and West), and a planner in the
Plans sub-directorate. There is also one civil
servant representative of State’s new Bureau of
Conflict and Stabilization Operations;64
•	J-9 (Outreach), which is headed by a Senior
FSO and also has two other FSOs, at least one
of whom has experience in public diplomacy
in Africa.65
Additionally, each of AFRICOM’s six component
commands, including Combined Joint Task ForceHorn of Africa as well as Special Operations Command-Africa, has a Foreign Service Officer serving as
a Foreign Policy Advisor, typically at the FS-1 (O-6 or
Colonel-equivalent) level.
Broadly speaking, all State Foreign Service Officer positions at AFRICOM are managed by the DoS
Political-Military Bureau, through its Political Advisor program. This important program is building a
cadre of FSOs who can bridge the bureaucratic cul-
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tural gap between diplomacy and defense, but it has
faced a number of serious challenges.66 First, there
are significantly fewer FSOs available than Political
Advisor positions. Second, incumbents of Political
Advisor positions have historically had fewer promotion opportunities, particularly into the FS-1 and
OC ranks (O-6 and O-7 equivalents), where supervision of ever larger numbers of personnel is practically
a prerequisite.
If Congress were to consider Goldwater-Nichols
legislation for the interagency, it should make officers take at least one interagency excursion tour
during a career as a requirement for promotion into
the senior ranks.67 For State, this might mean requiring an interagency detail before promotion into the
“senior” ranks, defined here as FS-1, or before promotion into the Senior Foreign Service.68 While the
current DoS promotion precepts instruct promotion
boards to give credit for interagency service, these
precepts also ask boards to weigh many other factors in deciding on whom to recommend for promotion. The net effect is that interagency service in most
cases is a net negative for career advancement, not
a positive.
The other U.S. agency at AFRICOM representing
one of the 3Ds is USAID, which has three staff members in Stuttgart. The Senior Development Advisor
reports directly to the Commander;69 a senior USAID
official heads the J-5 Health and Humanitarian Action
Branch; and a representative of the Agency’s Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance is in the combined J3/J4.
In terms of interagency players apart from DoS
and USAID, AFRICOM currently has a small contingency of over 20 personnel from more than 11 other
U.S. Government departments and agencies, includ-
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ing Agriculture (J-5), Energy (J-5), Commerce (J-9),
Justice/FBI (J-5), Homeland Security Investigations
(J-5), Transportation Security Administration (J-5),
the Coast Guard (J3/J4, J5, J9), and the intelligence
community (J-2), including the Office of the Director
for National Intelligence and National Security Agency.70 A few of these interagency representatives act
solely as liaison officers, but most are embedded into
AFRICOM.71
Aside from the percentage of interagency representatives at its headquarters, two other issues AFRICOM
faced during its initial standup were how interagency
representatives should be distributed within the Command’s organizational structure, and whether interagency representatives should be pure liaison officers
or embedded. As noted above, AFRICOM has chosen
to spread out interagency representatives among several of its directorates.72 By contrast, the U.S. Southern
Command has interagency players concentrated at its
Joint Interagency Task Force-South, the latter focusing
on an anti-narcotics mission.73 The U.S. Pacific Command, for its part, has tended to group interagency
players in the J-9 outreach branch—an approach that
has been criticized by some as isolating the interagency from other directorates, while praised by others as
an efficient way for Command teammates in a large
combatant command to have a one-stop shop for interagency advice and coordination.
The spreading of interagency representatives at
AFRICOM into different directorates does not currently pose problems with ease of access, vice concentrating them in the J-9. One important reason was that
the AFRICOM Foreign Policy Advisor started monthly Interagency Forum meetings, which allowed interagency representatives in different Directorates to get
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to know each other and noninteragency teammates.74
This Forum, currently chaired by the J-9 Director and
an elected member of the interagency, was created in
the wake of a 2008 Government Accountability Office
(GAO) report that found that the Command needed
to take new steps to improve the integration of its interagency representatives.75 At these Forum meetings,
invited speakers present views on various issues of
importance to the Command, as well as discuss the
professional, personal, and family challenges of work
and life in Stuttgart. The Forum also regularly shares
electronically, throughout the Command, contact information for members of the Interagency—thereby
creating a virtual one-stop interagency presence and
making it unnecessary to have a common directorate
(e.g., as was the case for the J-9 at Pacific Command).
The author’s view is that AFRICOM’s approach
was more appropriate for AFRICOM in that most midlevel interagency players in Stuttgart acted both as liaison officers to their home agencies and as embeds,
whose day-to-day work contributed directly to ongoing Command operations. At AFRICOM, the reality
for most interagency representatives was that there
was not enough work to justify a full-time liaison officer, and therefore being embedded in an appropriate
Directorate, e.g., Treasury in the J-5, made the most
sense. Of course, the reality is that every Command
is different and no one size fits all. For example, some
observers have praised Southern Command for having a mature interagency planning process—a situation that had not been the case at AFRICOM and
will be discussed further below. Southern Command
has also identified members of its interagency to be
the lead for each of its Theater Security Objectives,76
a best practice that AFRICOM should follow to fur-
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ther the early involvement of interagency partners.
The amount of interagency work at Pacific Command,
which is many times larger than AFRICOM, may also
justify more pure interagency liaison positions and a
centralization of interagency teammates into its J-9.
Accepting interagency teammates at its headquarters and components has not been the entirety of
AFRICOM’s commitment to the whole-of-government approach. AFRICOM has also significantly expanded the number of DoD personnel who are integrated into U.S. embassies across Africa over the past
3 years. Along with DoD personnel detailed to other
agencies in locations within the United States, this is
the new jointness flip side of AFRICOM’s receiving
interagency representatives at its headquarters and
components. Some of these new DoD personnel are
Defense Attachés, who typically come from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Most of the new personnel, however, are placed in new or existing Offices
of Security Cooperation, typically led by Army, Navy,
or Air Force Foreign Area Officers, with emerging Africa expertise and a rank of Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel (O-5 or O-6). These personnel, and the enlisted
staff who support them, are valuable members of U.S.
Embassy country teams and interact daily with their
fellow Embassy colleagues from State, USAID, and
other agencies.
Should Other Combatant Commands Upgrade the
Role of the Senior Interagency Representative?
The most distinctive CCMD Plus feature at
AFRICOM has been the appointment of a DoS Senior FSO as the Deputy to the Commander for CivilMilitary Activities and one of two co-equal Deputy
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Commanders along with the Deputy Commander for
Military Operations, a three-star Lieutenant General
or Vice Admiral. 77 The Deputy to the Commander
for Civil-Military Activities has broad responsibilities and directs the command’s plans and programs
associated with health, humanitarian assistance and
de-mining action, disaster response, security sector
reform, and Peace Support Operations. He or she also
directs Outreach (J-9), strategic communications, and
AFRICOM’s partner-building functions, as well as assures that policy development and implementation
are consistent with U.S. foreign policy.78 The three incumbents of AFRICOM’s Deputy to the Commander
for Civil-Military Activities position have all been
former Ambassadors with personal ranks of Minister-Counselor (two-star equivalent).79 All three also
brought to the Command deep geographic expertise
on Africa that simply did not exist previously within
AFRICOM or its predecessor components within the
U.S. European Command.80
At the U.S. Southern Command, by contrast, the
senior DoS representative has been dual-hatted as Civilian Deputy to the Commander and Foreign Policy
Advisor. This senior DoS representative has primary
responsible for overseeing the development and
ongoing refinement of the Command’s regional strategy and strategic communications, but has more narrow responsibilities.81 At the U.S. Pacific Command,
the senior DoS representative has an even more limited role as an advisor and is not presented on the Command’s website as part of its leadership, but rather appears as one of about 20 members of the Commander’s
“Special Staff,” in the “J-0.”82
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If one accepts the premise that cross-fertilization
within the U.S. Government to achieve a new jointness can be significantly advanced by accepting more
detailees from other agencies, it also follows that giving senior leaders from other agencies more substantive, supervisory responsibilities in one’s own agency
is a desirable new step. Given the increased emphasis
in the U.S. foreign policy community in recent years
on soft power activities and whole-of-government approaches, the author believes other geographic combatant commands should consider whether a dual
civilian-military Deputy Commander or some lesser
but yet upgraded role for their top interagency representative would also be desirable. For Southern Command, this might mean: 1) upgrading the position of
Deputy to the Commander to a co-equal Deputy Commander, as at AFRICOM; and, 2) creating a separate
position for a Political Advisor or Foreign Policy Advisor to travel with and advise the Commander. For the
Pacific, Central, and European Commands, this could
mean upgrading the Foreign Policy Advisor into a
Deputy to the Commander, as at Southern Command,
where the senior State officer is considered to be part
of the Command’s top leadership and has much more
than just an advisory role. It would also be desirable
that the appropriate role of the top interagency representative at each combatant command be considered
by Congress should it decide to pursue GoldwaterNichols-type legislation on new jointness.
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PART III - INTERNAL PERCEPTIONS OF
AFRICOM: ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY,
DEVELOPMENT WORK, INTERAGENCY
COORDINATION, AND STRATEGIC PLANNING
As noted above, the creation of AFRICOM in
2007 was controversial, both in the United States and
abroad. This section addresses four criticisms that have
been made of AFRICOM from within the U.S. Government, analyzes whether they are true, and describes
how the Command has responded to them. These four
criticisms are that the Command: 1) has undermined
the DoS’s interagency lead and militarized U.S. foreign policy; 2) has gotten “out of its lane” by doing
development work and doing it badly; 3) is a poor
interagency teammate; and, 4) does not adequately
integrate its strategic planning with the rest of the
U.S. Government.
1. Has AFRICOM Undermined the DoS Interagency Lead and Militarized U.S. Foreign Policy? Broadly
addressing the issue of “mission creep” by DoD into
areas that have traditionally been the prerogative of
the DoS, the U.S. Senate Foreign Affairs Committee
found in 2006 that:
As a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs . . . . U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived
gaps. Such bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas from civilian to military agencies risks weakening
the Secretary of State’s primacy in setting the agenda
for U.S. relations with foreign countries and the Secretary of Defense’s focus on war fighting.83
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Supporting this view, Defense Secretary Gates
stated in November 2007 that:
We must focus our energies beyond the guns and steel
of the military. We must focus our energies on the other elements of national power that will be so crucial in
the years to come. . . . What is clear for me is that there
is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the
civilian instruments of national security.84

In the same speech, Secretary Gates compared the
yearly defense appropriation—at the time about $500
billion, not counting the war in Iraq and Afghanistan—with an annual DoS budget of $36 billion. He
noted that even with new hires, there were 6,600 career U.S. diplomats, or “less than the manning of on
aircraft carrier strike group” (and about the size of a
Brigade Combat Team).85
Consistent with this, and specifically referring to
Africa, one Capitol Hill source told the author that
Congress has:
increasingly granted the Department of Defense its
own foreign military assistance authorities (Section
1206, including a new provision for anti-Lord’s Resistance Army support, and a new Section 1207 for East
Africa so [that] AFRICOM does . . . increasingly have
its own tools with which to engage African countries.86

Additionally, a comparison of summer 2011 staffing levels between 1) AFRICOM, 2) the entire DoS
as a whole, and 3) DoS’s Africa Bureau, while a case
of comparing an apple and two oranges, is nonetheless indicative of the disparity in human resources
between the U.S. military and the lead civilian agency responsible for national security/foreign policy
for Africa:
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•	AFRICOM staffing levels—assuming 2,000 personnel in Stuttgart, Molesworth, and Tampa,
and 3,200 in Djibouti—added with the staffing
at AFRICOM’s component commands, total
approximately 9,000 personnel.
•	DoS worldwide staffing levels of American personnel, by contrast, were as follows: 11,500
from the diplomatic corps (6,500 FSOs and
5,000 Foreign Service specialists (security, medical, finance, communications, secretarial), and
8,000 from the civil service.87
•	DoS Africa Bureau staffing was only about 200,
of whom about 150 were FSOs and civil servant
desk officers, and about 50 were administrative
and clerical support staff.88
Does the above mean that AFRICOM has undermined the DoS interagency lead and militarized U.S.
foreign policy? The author believes that the answer is
a clear “no.” The fact that AFRICOM is well funded
does not in itself mean that it has “taken over” the DoS
interagency lead. In reality, AFRICOM is not a leader
in making U.S. national security/foreign policy for
Africa, but rather a primary implementer of this policy.
Several of the initiatives that AFRICOM implements
are actually foreign military assistance programs carried out under the direction and funding of the DoS to
promote democracy and the rule of law and to prevent
pandemic diseases.89 For example, AFRICOM, in support of the DoS Global Peace Operations Initiatives
and Africa Contingency Operations and Training and
Assistance Program, provides military mentors to
support pre-deployment training to support African
nations which provide forces to AMISOM and other
peacekeeping operations.90 Additionally, as noted in
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the discussion in Box 3 of AFRICOM’s mission and
programs, Operation JUNIPER SHIELD is carried out
in support of the DoS Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism
Partnership, and the HIV/AIDS in the military program promotes goals of the DoS Office of the Global
AIDS Coordinator.
AFRICOM carries out its Theater Security Cooperation
programs in support of AFRICOM’s top five mission
goals. The 2012 Strategic Guidance recognizes that building partnership capacity “remains important for sharing
the costs and responsibilities of global leadership” with
states that value “freedom, stability, and prosperity.”
AFRICOM’s theater strategy has, since its inception, built
its foundation on two principles:
1. A safe, secure, and stable Africa is in the U.S. national interest; and,
2. Over the long run, it will be Africans who will
best be able to address African security challenges,
and AFRICOM most effectively advances U.S. security interests through focused security engagement with
African partners.
AFRICOM’s J-5 Director has explained the Command’s
focus on capacity building as follows:
Some may argue that changes in the strategic environment diminish the value of building partner capacity as a component of our nation’s overall defense
strategy. It makes more sense, they say, to dedicate
those scarce resources toward improving our own
capability than to improve those of other partners.
We disagree. Building the capacity of our . . . partners is not a strategic indulgence but rather an ensuring strategic imperative. . . . A prominent example
of how building the security capacity of our African
partners promotes the sharing of costs and responsi-
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bilities, supports our national interests, and provides
a high return on modest investments is our sustained
support to the African Union Mission in Somalia. .
. . Our direct and indirect efforts . . . contribute to
an African Union organization increasingly capable
of securing ungoverned space, defeating al-Shabaab,
and creating the conditions for a functioning state
of Somalia.

Following are a few of AFRICOM’s programs and
activities that help the Command meet these mission
goals via three primary capacity building functions:
building operational capacity, building institutional
capacity, and developing human capital:
1. Building Operational Capacity.
a. Operation JUNIPER SHIELD, formerly known
as Operation ENDURING FREEDOM—TRANS-SAHEL (OEF-TS), is DoD’s supporting effort to the DoS
Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership program, which focuses on overall security rather than
solely on counterterrorism. This program includes 10
African countries: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali,
Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. Operation JUNIPER SHIELD trains and equips
company-sized partner nation forces to help deter the
flow of illicit arms, goods, and people, and also fosters
collaboration and communication among participating countries.
b. Africa Partnership Station, the Command’s
premier maritime security engagement program, began in fall 2007 and is carried out by its Naval ForcesAfrica component. As a multinational security cooperation initiative, this partnership helps strengthen
Africa’s maritime security capacity through maritime
training, collaboration, infrastructure building, and
cross-border cooperation. The partnership focuses on
addressing four primary focus areas: maritime pro-
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fessionals, maritime infrastructure, maritime domain
awareness, and maritime response capability. Expertise shared during the mission includes law at sea, port
security, maritime interdiction operations, small-boat
maintenance, medical training, and more. In 2010, the
partnership included representatives from 9 European
allies, 17 African countries, and Brazil. Its aim is to improve maritime safety and security in Africa, while
building lasting relationships. Africa Partnership Station in 2011 consisted of seven U.S. ships and conducted activities with 22 African nations whose exchanges
involved more than 7,000 maritime professionals. Several African navies are now planning jointly, sharing
information at sea, and working together as a result of
this partnership. This includes multinational exercises
off the west and east coasts of Africa as well as in the
Gulf of Guinea.
c. AFRICOM also carries out a number of other
programs such as exercises designed to strengthen
the operational capacity of African militaries, including Exercise Flintlock, Exercise Natural Fire, Exercise
MEDFLAG, and a State Partnership Program under
which the National Guards of several U.S. states are
partnered bilaterally with individual African nations,
such as the Michigan National Guard with Liberia.
2. Building Institutional Capacity.
a. In January 2010, AFRICOM began a 5-year
defense sector reform program, Operation ONWARD
LIBERTY, to support the DoS’s broader security sector reform program in Liberia. The program provides
50-60 uniformed U.S. military mentors and advisors,
primarily from Marine Forces Africa, to the Armed
Forces of Liberia. Liberia also reactivated its Coast
Guard in February 2010, and, under the defense sector reform program, the U.S. Coast Guard provides
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a senior officer as a maritime advisor and to oversee
funding and training.
b. AFRICOM established the Africa Maritime
Law Enforcement Partnership program in 2008 to help
African nations counter illicit activities, including illegal oil bunkering, poaching of fisheries, drug trafficking, and piracy. The program, through bilateral maritime law enforcement agreements, shares with partner
nations the Coast Guard’s law enforcement skill set
for conducting law enforcement boardings, gathering
evidence, maintaining chains of custody, and, at sea,
space accountability. Coast Guard Law Enforcement
Detachments are embarked aboard U.S. Navy or Coast
Guard vessels, where they train African partners
and actually engage with them in law enforcement
operations.
c. Other AFRICOM programs designed to address institutional capacity are Exercise Africa Endeavor, the Partnership for Integrated Logistics Operations
and Tactics, and the Pandemic Response Program.
3. Developing Human Capital.
a. AFRICOM helps to professionalize militaries
and reinforce the democratic value of elected civilian
authority though funding from the DoS-led International Military Education Training programs and an
enhanced version of this program known as E-IMET.
These programs are the most widely used military assistance programs in AFRICOM’s area of responsibility and have contributed to stronger bilateral military
relationships between the United States and partner
countries. Regional seminars with a U.S. Defense Institute for International Legal Studies military education teams funded by this program have helped many
nations implement security sector and judicial sector
reform. Many African officers and enlisted graduates
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of this program go on to fill key positions in their militaries and governments.
b. AFRICOM’s HIV/AIDS in the Military program reaches 40 African countries and is aimed at
mitigating the impacts of the disease on African military readiness and assisting in the development and
implementation of culturally focused, military-specific
HIV prevention, care, and treatment programs. AFRICOM implements this program on behalf of the DoD’s
HIV/AIDS Prevention Program Office and the State
Department Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator in support of the President’s Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief.
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AFRICOM’s J-5 Director recently used budgetary
figures and authorities to make the point that AFRICOM plays only a “supporting (emphasis added) role
to broader U.S. Government efforts across Africa”
and demonstrates this support through Command’s
“close collaboration with the State Department as well
as other agencies”:
Military engagements comprise a small but critical element of U.S. Government activities in Africa. To illustrate this, compare the Department of State and USAFRICOM spending in Africa. In fiscal year 2012 (FY 12),
the Department of State spent approximately $7 billion on the . . . countries in our [area of responsibility]
on a wide array of health, development, and security
programs under its Title 22 authorities. Approximately $3.3 billion of this $7 billion funded security-related
programs such as peacekeeping, nonproliferation,
antiterrorism, narcotics control and law enforcement,
military education, and equipment financing. . . . By
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contrast, USAFRICOM in FY 12 controlled, influenced, and administered a modest $515 million in Title
22 and Title 10 security cooperation program dollars.
. . . USAFRICOM then supported and administered
$130 million in traditional Department of State Title
22-funded programs such as Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training . .
. . [Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance] . . . the Partnership for Regional East Africa
Counterterrorism, . . . [Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership] . . . and [the] Africa Maritime Security Initiative.91

2. Has AFRICOM Done Development Work Badly? A second U.S. Government internal criticism of
AFRICOM, and a subset of the first criticism that AFRICOM is taking over the DoS lead in U.S. national
security/foreign policy, is that the Command is: carrying out development work when it should not; and,
2) doing so badly. In terms of 1), these critics believe
the United States should restrict the activities of its
military personnel to training and equipping programs, and instead implement all development projects through USAID, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), international organizations, and private development firms.92 Beyond AFRICOM “getting out of
its (bureaucratic) lane,” officials at USAID have also
been concerned that humanitarian and development
projects could be “stigmatized” by links to the military,93 waste taxpayers’ money,94 and do more harm
than good in the recipient countries, thereby undermining U.S. national security/foreign policy. These
observers complain that AFRICOM’s development
activities are largely ad hoc, without a plan to support lasting change, and without regard for a broader
development strategy.95
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What to make of these critics? AFRICOM can be
fairly criticized for the execution of some of its development projects, but these criticisms appear to be
overblown for two reasons. First, it is actually senior
DoS and USAID officials in Stuttgart—not military officers—who are responsible for oversight and implementation of the development projects at AFRICOM.
AFRICOM’s Deputy to the Command for Civil-Military Activities has been given formal oversight for all
development-related projects at the Command. The
head of the Humanitarian Affairs Branch within AFRICOM’s J-5 has always been a senior USAID Foreign
Service Officer who reported to this Deputy Commander through the J-5 Director and Deputy Director
for Programs.96
Second, the actual amounts of funding for AFRICOM’s “development” projects are quite small, and
these projects usually have a clear link to security/
military affairs.97 DoD, for example, established an
HIV/AIDS prevention program with African armed
forces.98 Of the $150 million dollars in FY2011 that
AFRICOM spent on development and health-related
activities, 87 percent was actually HIV/AIDS-related.
Since the rate of infection in some African militaries is high, reportedly as high as 50 percent in some
southern African countries, this is an important public health as well as military-related program. Given
that African militaries prefer mil-to-mil engagements
instead of working with donor-country development
agencies, it is appropriate that AFRICOM currently
provides oversight to this program via USAID staff
detailed to the Command.
After subtracting out this HIV/AIDS in the military program, the Command had less than $20 million in “humanitarian assistance”—a modest amount
that belies the notion that AFRICOM is militarizing
39

U.S. aid to Africa. By contrast, USAID’s Africa bureau
alone programmed more than $4.1 billion in development assistance for FY2011—excluding food aid and
emergency response programs.99
This is not to say that there have not been serious
problems with some AFRICOM-led development
projects. For example, an April 2010 GAO report criticized Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa’s
management of humanitarian and development projects.100 GAO found that AFRICOM lacked procedures
for tracking and following up on the Task Force’s development projects, and for ensuring these projects
appropriately fit within broader U.S. foreign policy
goals. For example, the GAO visited a dilapidated
school that the Task Force had built but long forgotten, and a well that the Task Force had dug without
considering how the placement could cause conflicts
within clan relationships. The GAO linked part of this
mismanagement to the Task Force’s extremely short
tour rotations and insufficient cultural sensitivity
training—the net result of which was to undermine
the attempts at wielding soft power in the region.101 As
another example, research by Tufts University’s Feinstein International Center found similar dysfunction
in the Task Force’s “hearts and minds” activities in
eastern Kenya.102 Kenyan recipients were grateful for a
successful development project, but much more likely
to maintain an opinion of the U.S. military informed
by its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.103
Since Djibouti is the host country for AFRICOM’s
only forward-operating site on the continent, the author believes that it makes sense for the Command to
sponsor civilian action projects in Djibouti itself, relative to other countries in the Horn of Africa. Nevertheless, even in the case of Djibouti, these projects should
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not be led by military personnel, other than policy
guidance from AFRICOM in Stuttgart and civil-military affairs officers in Djibouti, but rather by USAID
in conjunction with the local Embassy country team.
For the rest of Horn of Africa countries, it would be
preferable to let embassy country teams lead in project
selection as part of the Mission’s Strategic Resources
Planning strategy. They should do this while working
in a collaborative fashion with the Senior Defense Official at Post, shaping the projects so that they also meet
their Theater Security Objectives.104 In this regard, it is
notable that DoD’s creation of Senior Defense Officials
at Embassies—the Defense Attaché or Chief of the Office of Security Cooperation—has helped to relieve
some of the confusion at embassies about how the
various DoD components in a given country report to
the Ambassador.
3. Poor Interagency Coordination? AFRICOM Improves Greatly. A third internal U.S. Government criticism of AFRICOM is that the Command has not coordinated well with the rest of the interagency. In the
author’s view, this may be the criticism with the least
validity because AFRICOM has rightly been cited as a
unique organization that has been an “experiment” or
even “model” for whole-of-government approaches.
Nevertheless, some observers, including the GAO,
have found that AFRICOM was not living up to expectations regarding integration of its work with the
rest of the foreign policy community.105 These observers have asserted that this outcome is not surprising,
because U.S. national security and foreign policy institutions have long been stovepiped from one another
with their own priorities and “alien” bureaucratic
cultures. Drawing from a well-known book analyzing
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the differences between men and women, some have
used the metaphor that DoD personnel are from Mars,
while DoS and USAID staff are from Venus.106
At the end of the day, are these criticisms fair? To
do its job well, AFRICOM needs to address three levels of interagency coordination:
1. Coordination with U.S. Embassies in Africa,
which are headed by Ambassadors constitutionally
appointed by the President, and whose country team
members also typically include representatives from
multiple agencies;107
2. Coordination between the Command in Stuttgart and U.S. Government agencies in Washington;108
and,
3. Internal coordination with the Command between military officers and DoD civilians on the one
hand, and non-DoD interagency civilians on the other.
The author’s research for this Paper and prior professional experience while at AFRICOM suggest that,
early on in its existence, AFRICOM did have at least
limited problems with all three types of interagency
coordination, but that—by and large—AFRICOM
overcame these issues as the Command matured:
a. AFRICOM’s Coordination with U.S. Ambassadors and their Missions. With regard to AFRICOM’s
relations with U.S. embassies, good interagency coordination requires respect by the Command of Chief of
Mission authority, both from a policy and operational
perspective. Theresa Whelan, then Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, stressed in
early 2007 that European Command had established
good working relationships with U.S. Ambassadors
and expected that AFRICOM would do so as well:
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The creation of U.S. Africa Command [will] not in any
way subordinate U.S. Ambassadors to the Command,
or the DOD, or put the Command in any position to be
able to dictate to those Ambassadors what they will or
will not do. The command, just like European Command today, Central Command today, and Pacific
Command today . . . will continue to be a supporting
effort to those Ambassadors in regards to peacetime
mi-to-mil relations with the countries in which those
Ambassadors serve.109

For AFRICOM, starting in 2007, there was also
some degree of internal chaos as the young Command
staffed up at a rapid rate and developed new internal
procedures. With only some exaggeration, “veterans”
of the transfer from the European Command have described to the author how the Command grew from
a core of little more than a dozen staffers in 2007 to
over 2,000 in a little over 4 years—an extraordinary
rate of growth that would have challenged the best
leaders and managers.110 The author believes that
fumbles with the interagency and U.S. embassies during the early years with AFRICOM likely had less to
do with a “military takeover” and bad faith than with
a lack of clear internal procedures to ensure good
coordination.111
Consistent with this benign interpretation of AFRICOM’s initial coordination problems, a DoS Office
of Inspector General report of August 2009 assessing
the capacity of the Department’s Africa Bureau found
problems with internal communication within the
DoS, not AFRICOM:
Inadequate communication between the Bureau and
embassies led to confusion about AFRICOM’s role
and the parameters of U.S. ambassador’s authority
in the beginning, although the [Office of the Inspec-
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tor General] found that ‘there is every indication that
the new Assistant Secretary and the AFRICOM Commander are working cooperatively’. 112

AFRICOM’s Commanders have also actively
courted U.S. Ambassadors during Command briefs to
visiting Chief of Missions passing through Stuttgart
and during trips by the Commanders on the continent. Most Ambassadors pass through the Command
on their way to post, or wait 6 months to get their feet
on the ground before they come to the Command to
discuss security cooperation and other AFRICOM activities in their host countries. After establishing this
face-to-face contact, many Ambassadors have actively
engaged with the Command’s leadership, usually via
the Commander, but also sometimes directly with the
heads of Directorates such as the J-2, J-5, and J-9. Over
time, U.S. Ambassadors have learned to appreciate
the additional resources that AFRICOM can bring to
their diplomatic missions.
If there has been any continuing friction between
AFRICOM and U.S. Ambassadors, it has been largely
operational in nature and due to the large numbers
of AFRICOM temporary duty personnel deploying to
the continent—and the significant logistical challenges they bring for smaller U.S. Missions with limited
staff. AFRICOM’s large and growing programming
in Africa, while welcome, risks at times overwhelming the soft power of USAID and State programs and
personnel, a senior DoS Africa Bureau official testified
in 2011.113
Part of AFRICOM’s improved interagency coordination with the rest of the U.S. Government and U.S.
Embassies comes from effective communication of the
Command’s philosophy by its top leadership. General
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Ham, for example, emphasized strong interagency coordination in remarks to his staff in 2011:
Accomplishing our mission . . . requires us to ensure
our military efforts are synchronized with many other
in the U.S. Government. In some cases, Africa Command will be in the lead; in others, ours will be a supporting effort to another department or agency. Our
military activities will always be in support of U.S.
Government foreign policy and fully coordinated with
affected U.S. Chiefs of Mission.114

AFRICOM’s coordination with Ambassadors’
staffs at the working level has also improved. For example, AFRICOM also engages in limited public diplomacy projects with a security theme. Because they
involve outreach to host-nation publics, however,
these projects should have U.S. Embassy approval
and be implemented in coordination with the Embassy’s Public Affairs Officer (PAO). In one West African
country that the author visited in 2011, AFRICOM
coordinated an outreach program to the Muslim community with the PAO. AFRICOM personnel reported
directly to the PAO on their day-to-day work, with the
result that both AFRICOM and the U.S. Embassy were
pleased with the project outcomes.
b. AFRICOM’s Coordination with the Washington
Interagency. By all accounts, there have been strong
senior-level working relationships between AFRICOM
Commanders Ward and Ham and between Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazier
under the Bush administration and Ambassador Johnnie Carson under the Obama administration. Aiding
strong AFRICOM-State high-level communication
have been the Command’s successive Deputy to the
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Commander for Civil-Military Activities and Foreign
Policy Advisors, who were also from the DoS.
While some observers have asserted that all-powerful Combatant Commanders can appear like rogue
Roman pro-consuls engaging in foreign policy formulation, the reality could not be further from the truth
at AFRICOM.115 For example, Generals William Ward
and Ham were entrusted by the DoS leadership with
carrying certain security-related foreign policy messages to their military counterparts. Assistant Secretary Carson, for example, asked General Ward to pass
a message to the interim President in Guinea, General Sekouba Konate, urging Konate to support the
Presidential elections. This eventually contributed to
the first democratic elections in that country’s entire
history.116 Also, in innumerable meetings with Africa
military and civilian leaders, including a great number of heads of state, both Commanders were effective
diplomat-soldiers and symbolic “Ambassadors” for
the United States in their own right.117
Indeed, AFRICOM has recently received praise for
its work, not criticism from high-level State colleagues.
In terms of AFRICOM’s work with the interagency in
Washington, State’s Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa, Ambassador Donald Yamamoto,
in July 2011 congressional testimony, praised AFRICOM’s role in “supporting” (emphasis added) U.S. foreign policy on a broad range of issues:
The U.S. Department of State has coordinated and collaborated with AFRICOM as it worked to achieve the
Administration’s highest priority goals related to democracy, good governance, the peaceful resolution of
conflicts, and transnational challenges . . . AFRICOM
has played an important supporting role in implementing this framework . . . . [Areas of coordination and
collaboration include] military professionalization;
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building counterterrorism capacity; disaster management; peacekeeping capacity building; humanitarian
operations coordinated with USAID; demining and
ammunition handling training; nonproliferation of
weapons of mass destruction; destruction of excess
small arms and light weapons and unstable ammunition; reduction of excess and poorly secured man-portable air defense systems. . . . Defense Sector Reform in
Liberia, [the Democratic Republic of the Congo], and
South Sudan; counter-piracy activities off the Somali
coast; maritime safety and security capacity building;
and civil-military cooperation.118

Ambassador Donald Yamamoto further noted
that AFRICOM elements at U.S. embassies implement DoS-funded Foreign Military Financing and
International Military Education and Training programs, which further U.S. interests in Africa by helping to professionalize African militaries and to train
and equip them toward common security goals.119 In
other words, and as noted above, AFRICOM has been
supporting the DoS lead in foreign affairs by acting
as the implementing agency for certain programs for
which State retains the policy lead and the budget
purse strings.
Several other examples suggest that AFRICOM’s
relations with the interagency at the working level are
also strong:
Counterterrorism: While at AFRICOM, the author
observed regularly scheduled, periodic, workinglevel meetings between the DoS Africa Bureau staff
and mid-level AFRICOM personnel to support State’s
Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership through
AFRICOM’s implementation of Operation JUNIPER
SHIELD.120 These meetings, which included the occasional participation of the J-3 Director and Deputy
Director for Operations, attested to the close and
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professional working relationship between State and
AFRICOM.
Counternarcotics: AFRICOM’s Counternarcotics
Office has been coordinating closely with the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and Treasury in West Africa, funding training
activities and supporting maritime and airport
interdiction efforts.121
Maritime Security: There has been excellent collaboration between AFRICOM’s J-5 Air/Maritime
Branch, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the
DoS (Bureaus of African Affairs and Political Military Affairs and the Office of the Legal Advisor), the
U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Department of Justice
to promote greater maritime security cooperation
between the Economic Community of West African
States, the Economic Community of Central African
States, and their 25 member-states.
Law Enforcement: AFRICOM has worked well
with State’s Africa and International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Bureaus and on workshops with
the Economic Community of West African States that
are part of a trans-Atlantic maritime criminal justice
program, and with the U.S. Coast Guard on the African Maritime Law Enforcement Program.
c. Internal Integration of Interagency Personnel at
AFRICOM. A third part of AFRICOM’s relationship
with the interagency has been the integration of nonDoD civilians into the Command itself. A July 2010
GAO report indicated that:
AFRICOM has made efforts to integrate interagency
personnel into its command and collaborate with oth48

er federal agencies on activities, but [was] not fully engaging interagency partners in planning processes.122

At the time that the author arrived at AFRICOM
for a 1-year tour in July 2010, the GAO’s assessment
was accurate: most interagency colleagues wanted
to be helpful, but at times felt excluded from certain
Command work deemed inherently “military” in nature by uniformed and civilian DoD colleagues—the
latter of whom were mainly retired military.
Interagency integration within AFRICOM progressed over time as representatives of various agencies became more familiar with the Command and
its military bureaucratic culture and, as noted above,
were aided by monthly Forum meetings chaired by
the Foreign Policy Advisor. As discussed below, a
systematic effort was made by the J-5 in early-2011 to
seek interagency comments on its engagement plans
and country work plans. The Command also started a
fusion center in 2011 in the J-3 to support all of the Directorates; this center provides access to interagency
staff assigned to help support it.
The watershed event for interagency integration
at AFRICOM, however, was Operation ODYSSEY
DAWN against Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi.
After this operation was initiated, an interagency coordination cell was established to coordinate requests
for information directed at the interagency. Several
members of the interagency distinguished themselves
during this period, notably U.S. Treasury officials addressing financial sanctions issues and the Department
of Energy liaison officer, whose own knowledge and
sources in Washington were crucial in understanding the damaged state of Libyan oil infrastructure.
The star teammate, however, was the USAID Office
of Foreign Disaster Assistance representative, who
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provided valuable insights into how the Command
needed to work with the international donor community, e.g., to carry out repatriations of Egyptians
fleeing into Tunisia from Libya. While AFRICOM’s
command and control during the operation could
have been better,123 and while the interagency had its
own “lessons learned” from the operation, most nonDoD representatives felt immense pride at having
been a small part of a military operation that garnered
global attention, and a greater sense that they were
now bona fide members of the AFRICOM team. In a
broader sense, AFRICOM’s success in the operation
was also helpful in validating the Command’s new
jointness whole-of-government model because timely
responses to certain requests for information would
have been difficult, if not impossible, without interagency representatives present in Stuttgart.
Five years after AFRICOM’s creation, overall interagency integration into the Command is now largely
complete. While interagency individuals new to the
Command still have to overcome initial bureaucratic
“culture shock” of adapting to a military environment, the procedures and training to welcome them
to the Command are in place, and their integration
more rapid and complete.124 This is not to imply, however, that all is perfect. There are some U.S. agencies
that continue to question the valued of sending embedded officials to AFRICOM—a situation that could
be improved if, as advocated above, the Command
reached cost-sharing agreements more attractive to the
agencies concerned.
d. AFRICOM Corrects the Interagency Strategic
Planning Disconnect. A fourth area where AFRICOM
received U.S. Government internal criticism but has
subsequently matured and strengthened its integra50

tion into the foreign policy community is in strategic
planning. AFRICOM completed its theater strategy
and theater campaign plans in September 2008 and
May 2009, respectively, with input from the DoS/
USAID Joint Strategic Plan, DoS Africa Bureau Strategic Plan, and USAID’s Strategic Plan for Africa.125
Table 4 shows the nesting of DoD planning documents starting from the U.S. National Security Strategy and National Security Presidential Directive 50
down to country work plans and their interaction with
Embassy Mission Strategic Resource Plans (MSRPs).126

Source: GAO Presentation of DoD data.

Table 4. AFRICOM Strategic Plans,
including Nesting with Non-DoD MSRPs.
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AFRICOM had sought interagency input into its
plans. The command invited interagency members
from both Washington and U.S. Embassies in Africa to attend AFRICOM’s annual Theater Security
Cooperation Conference. Deputy Chiefs of Mission,
who typically play a leading role with other country team members in crafting their Ambassadors’
MSRPs, were particularly invited. However, as noted
in a July 2010 GAO report, AFRICOM had not completed many of its supporting plans roughly 3 years
after the Command’s establishment. The Command’s
regional engagement plans were first drafted only in
late-2010.The Command’s work plans for the top 20odd priority countries were being completed for the
first time late in 2011 and early in 2012, with country
work plans for lower-priority countries to be added
in spring 2012—well over 4 years after the Command
was established.127 One unfortunate result of this was
that the Command spent tens of millions of dollars of
taxpayer money on training and equipment programs
from 2007-2011, without detailed country-level strategic plans, without continuous consultation with officials from other agencies such as DoS and USAID,
and without a truly effective assessments process with
credible parameters to measure effects.
Fortunately, AFRICOM improved considerably
in response to the 2010 GAO critique. The Command
now has four “Subordinate Campaign Plans,” which
are hybrid thematic and geographic, and which include
Intermediate Military Objectives that are measurable
and achievable within 5 years. The four Subordinate
Campaign Plans, as shown in Table 5, are organized
geographically (and thematically) for:
•	
East (focused on counterterrorism, including
related Somali piracy);
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•	North-West (focused on counterterrorism);
•	
Gulf of Guinea (focused on maritime security, and including all 25 member-states of the
Economic Communities of Central and West
Africa); and,
•	Central (focused on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as the
Lord’s Resistance Army problem).

Table 5. AFRICOM Theater Campaign Plan,
Component Plans, and Subordinate
Campaign Plans.
The Subordinate Campaign Plan replaced five
Regional Engagement Plans, which had covered all
training, exercises and all other engagement activities
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for east, north, west, central, and southern Africa. A
senior AFRICOM J-5 official acknowledged that the
four new, more thematically focused Subordinate
Campaign Plans did not cover southern Africa, and
that the Command was willing to “take a modest
amount of risk” in this regard.
AFRICOM has also improved its annual planning
cycle. In the past, AFRICOM had been criticized by
several federal agency officials” for having a single,
large consultative conference at the end of the fiscal
year, which only served to validate the criticism that
AFRICOM tended to “plan activities first and then engage partners, rather than including interagency perspectives during the initial planning efforts.” One example
cited by GAO of the problems that this lack of prior
interagency coordination caused was in the otherwise
highly successful Africa Partnership Station program,
which resulted in “unnecessary delays, confusion, and
turmoil with the U.S. embassy in Ghana, during the 2009
port visit by the USS Nashville.”128
At the time of the GAO study’s release in summer
2010, two critical but unfinished linkages in AFRICOM’s planning process were the integration of the
Command’s country work plans with Embassy Mission Strategic Resource Plans, and of the Command’s
regional plans to the State Department’s Africa Bureau
Strategic Resource Plan. AFRICOM completed these
linkages when it kicked off its new Annual Planning
Cycle in 2011. The annual cycle begins with Country Cooperation Meetings in which the Command
jointly develops Country Level Objectives with Chiefs
of Mission and Host Nation officials. The objectives
shape the Command’s priorities prior to entering the
latter half of the fiscal year, when a series of functional
conferences are conducted that also support the de-
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velopment of the Subordinate Campaign Plans. The
annual planning cycle concludes with the new AFRICOM Theater Synchronization Conference in early
September, to which are invited the State Department
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, the senior USAID official for Africa, and Deputy Chiefs of Mission.
Instead of being organized purely by region, this annual conference is organized based on each Subordinate Campaign Plan which, as noted above, is a hybrid
plan focused thematically but also covering a discrete
geographic areas.
Beyond improving its annual planning cycle, AFRICOM has taken two other steps that have improved
coordination with the Interagency:
1. AFRICOM, since its inception, systematically
opened new Office of Security Cooperation offices—
increasing from eight to almost three dozen. With the
support of the DIA, AFRICOM has also added new
Defense Attaches in a small number of new countries, including Burkina Faso. These new DoD teammates at U.S. Embassies in Africa, in daily contact
with their interagency colleagues and with a much
better on-the-ground appreciation of realities in
their host government and country, have also helped
interagency coordination.
2. AFRICOM’s J-5 further established a small “Synchronization Division” to ensure proper coordination
with U.S. Embassies and Washington, and has asked
its planning teams to offer to brief U.S. Embassy front
offices, particularly Deputy Chiefs of Mission, when
visiting their host countries.129
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PART IV - EXTERNAL PERCEPTIONS OF
AFRICOM: AFRICA, ENERGY, CHINA,
AND FRANCE
In this section, the author first addresses the critical issue of African attitudes toward AFRICOM and
then debunks three damaging yet perennial myths
about the Command’s role in energy security, the rise
of China in Africa, and France’s alleged opposition
to AFRICOM.
African Attitudes toward AFRICOM: Past, Present,
and Future.
The number one theme for Sub-Saharan Africa in
the 2012-13 Key Strategic Issues List published by the
Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War
College is “Assess the evolving role and organization
of AFRICOM, and its receptivity within Africa” (italics
added). SSI’s focus on African reactions to AFRICOM
is on the mark. So vociferous was initial African opposition to AFRICOM’s creation in 2007 that the AU
issued a nonbinding resolution asking member-states
not to host AFRICOM on the continent. For its part,
the Southern African Development Community,
one of the AU’s most important Regional Economic
Communities, declared that none of its 14 memberstates would be willing to host U.S. forces. Nigeria,
Africa’s most populous country and a regional powerhouse in West Africa, endeavored to block AFRICOM from establishing its headquarters in the Gulf of
Guinea region.130
Pointing to 9/11, and U.S.-led wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, many African opinion leaders were concerned in 2007 that AFRICOM’s founding reflected
a growing militarization of U.S. relations with their
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continent and a new focus on anti-terrorism at the expense of traditional development aid.131 They feared
that—far from alleviating the continent’s insecurity—
AFRICOM would incite, not deter, terrorist attacks.132
Some feared U.S. support for repressive regimes.
Others accused the United States of a “new imperialism,” and said AFRICOM was a tool for U.S. “exploitation” of Africa’s oil and mineral wealth. Many
African governments and civil society opinion leaders were also vehemently opposed to the creation of
AFRICOM because:
•	
They felt inadequately consulted during the
conceptualization of AFRICOM, and resented
the Command as yet another fait accompli hoisted on the continent by a superpower not interested in listening to African views about their
own future;
•	AFRICOM’s headquarters were originally proposed to be in Africa—a decision that revealed
DoD’s lack of understanding of the politics of
the continent. Any country hosting a new U.S.
military command, for example, would be
severely criticized for violating Africa’s common positions on African defense and security,
which discourage the hosting of foreign troops
on African soil;133
•	Africans often have a very negative view of their
own militaries because of past misbehavior, including coups, mistreatment of civilians, and
corruption. Even though the reality is that U.S.
military personnel are professional and committed to civilian control, they are perceived
by some Africans as untrustworthy as African
militaries or, even worse, as neo-colonialists;
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•	AFRICOM was particularly strongly opposed,
at least initially, by countries such as South
Africa and Nigeria, which saw it as a threat to
their status as regional hegemons.
•	There was also a concern that AFRICOM, even
if initially a positive, “new” kind of CCMD
Plus, would suffer from mission creep and
evolve from an engagement and training focus
to an interventionist force, such as allegedly
occurred with Operation RESTORE HOPE in
Somalia in 1992.134
Reacting to this vociferous African pushback, the
Bush administration decided in May 2008 to defer any
final decision on the location of AFRICOM’s headquarters. This resulted in more African states publicly
acknowledging their willingness to work with the
new Command, including Nigeria. By October 2008,
the majority of African states had at least acquiesced
to the idea that the U.S. military had established a military command responsible for Africa.135 The GAO reported in February 2009 that DoD had also taken steps
to clarify AFRICOM’s mission, including publishing
an approved mission statement, but had not yet finalized a strategy for future communication with African
and other stakeholders.136
Since the 2009 GAO report, AFRICOM’s leadership has used a more consistent and comprehensive
communications strategy with African stakeholders.
The Command’s first head, General Ward, repeatedly
emphasized in public that AFRICOM was a “listening and learning” organization. As a charismatic and
outgoing African-American, General Ward was particularly effective in connecting with African military
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counterparts and the African public. AFRICOM’s second Commander, General Ham, also strove to keep
a consistent, positive narrative in public statements
about the Command’s mission. General Ham has often repeated in testimony and public comments the
African proverb, “If you want to go quickly, go alone.
If you want to go far, go together,” adding in February
2012, for example, that:
We, at US Africa Command, choose to go far. We
choose to go together, with our African partners as
well as together with our many interagency partners,
to better meet their security interests and to advance
the security interest of the United States.137

Beyond style, African governments and citizens
have also seen for themselves, through AFRICOM’s
various engagement activities since 2007, that the new
institution was not what they feared it to be, but instead was a continuation and sometimes expansion
of existing U.S.-Africa security cooperation.138 Consequently, AFRICOM has over time been received with
cautious optimism by several African governments
and militaries. They view increased American attention to the continent’s problems as a positive development, potentially bringing increased resources, training, and assistance.139
In a farewell interview in September 2012 before
leaving AFRICOM, then Deputy to the Commander
for Civil-Military Activities Ambassador J. Anthony
Holmes stated that a primary area where he had seen
considerable progress was in the Command’s relationship with African partners:
The relationship that this Command has developed
with African militaries over the four years since it was
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formally stood up are so much more solid today. . . .
The level of suspicion one encounters is just a small
shadow of what it was four years ago.140

Consistent with this, current Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, Amanda J.
Dory, stated in an October 2012 interview that:
The U.S. military effort on the continent is being accepted by many African leaders . . . when U.S. Africa
Command first stood up, there was concern among
some leaders that it signified a ‘militarization of U.S.
foreign policy and a sort of creeping colonialism’.
Those fears have subsided.141

While AFRICOM’s vocal opponents are becoming
fewer and perhaps more fringe than mainstream, the
Command cannot become complacent because there
remains strong opposition to AFRICOM among certain African audiences. Box 4 provides what is admittedly an unscientific sample of titles of articles that
appeared during a September 2012 Google search for
the keyword “AFRICOM.” There are a broad range
of provocative articles opposing the Command with
titles such as: “AFRICOM’s Imperial Agenda Marches
On,” “Beware the Rotten Fruit of AFRICOM Training,”
“Resist AFRICOM—Puppet Masters,” “AFRICOM or
Africon?” and “AFRICOM: Devil in the Backyard.”142
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Resist AFRICOM (1, N/A)
ASRP The Campaign to Resist AFRICOM (4, N/A)
AFRICOM’s Imperial Agenda Marches On:
Black Agenda Report (9, 2012)
Beware the Rotten Fruit of AFRICOM Training
(12, 2012)
Globalist Warlord Obama Moves to Expand AFRICOM
Reach (12, 2011)
AFRICOM: Washington’s New Imperial Weapon
(12, N/A)
Gaddafi vs AFRICOM and the Re-colonization of Africa
(13, 2012)
AFRICOM: Wrong for Liberia, Disastrous for Africa
(13, 2007)
Land Destroyer: Nigeria: The Next Front for AFRICOM
(13, 2012)
AFRICOM: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing (16, 2011)
NATO, AFRICOM and the New White Man’s Burden
(17, 2011)
Re-packaged AFRICOM Still not Good for Motherland
(21, 2010)
AFRICOM: US Military Control of Africa’s Resources
(22, 2007)
AFRICOM and the Re-colonization of Africa (24, 2012)
AFRICOM Backs Bloodshed in Central Africa (25, 2010)
Resist AFRICOM – Puppet Masters (31, 2012)
The Imperial Agenda of the USA-AFRICOM Marches
On (31, 2012)
AFRICOM: Rise, Resist and Revolt (34, 2012)
Say No To AFRICOM Conspiracy (42, NA)
Rumble in the Jungle: The AFRICOM Boondoggle
(46, 2007)
Africom or Africon? (47, 2009)
AFRICOM: Devil in the Backyard (o/a 40, 2011)
AFRICOM off African Soil Petition (o/a 48, 2011)
Note: Search conducted on September 27, 2012.

Box 4. Selected Headlines on AFRICOM
in First 50 Pages under Google Search
with Key Word “AFRICOM”
(Page of Appearance: Year of Article).
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In the future, military operations by U.S. forces on
the African continent could damage African perceptions of AFRICOM most, particularly if this were to involve U.S. “boots on the ground.” Combat operations
were, of course, never excluded from AFRICOM’s
mandate, merely downplayed.143 Operation ODYSSEY
DAWN, while largely an air/naval operation that
did not involve U.S. soldiers landing in Libya, was
seized on by critics of AFRICOM as “proof” that the
Command was, as they had always asserted, a wolf
in sheep’s clothing. Other Africans, however, did not
oppose the Operation, because they were relieved to
see the end of the 42-year Libyan dictatorship.
Part of the reason that AFRICOM’s military operations have not generated strong, consistent resistance
among sub-Saharan African stakeholders is that they
have been in support of goals with which many Bantu
Africans could identify. These include opposing the
terrorist group Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) and Touareg allies who, in March 2012, took
control of northern Mali from mainly the southern
Mali-based, Bantu-speaking tribes that have dominated Mali’s central government since independence.
Similarly, the AFRICOM effort to aid the capture of
Lord’s Resistance Army leader Joseph Kony and its
effort to support the AU’s bid to rid Somalia of al-Shabaab are causes with which most Africans can identify.
One kind of AFRICOM “military operation” that
could cause a strong African backlash in the future are
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance flights
or kinetic operations by drones. The gist of a recent article in The Washington Post on U.S. drones reportedly
being flown out of Djibouti144 was widely re-reported
in the African media. While AFRICOM’s reported intelligence activities in the Sahel, and Central and East
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Africa have avoided much criticism so far, they could
eventually trigger strong African opposition, much
as the increasingly obvious “drone wars” in Pakistan
have triggered so much public condemnation in the
Middle East. Consistent with this, a recent Africa Center for Strategic Studies report on Islamic militancy
concluded in November 2012 that:
Islamic militant organizations in African generally
only command the support of small minorities within
Muslim communities. However, ill-considered interventions, especially those involving Western forces,
can reinforce the militant’s narrative, thereby strengthening their credibility and recruitment.145

This analysis implies that AFRICOM must be cognizant of the possible, longer-term, unintended consequences of any military operations that it may undertake in Africa.
Already, multiple non-African sources consulted
by the author were concerned that AFRICOM had already gone too far in emphasizing military operations
versus its traditional focus on steady-state security engagement. To paraphrase one European colonel, “AFRICOM was once a good idea but has been hijacked
by an increased focus on military operations.” One senior U.S. Government source who preferred to remain
anonymous decried an alleged focus at the Command
on kinetic operations.
The author believes that AFRICOM’s operations
related to Libya, Somalia, the Lord’s Resistance Army,
and its current role in advising officials from the Economic Community of West African States involved in
planning a multinational campaign to oust al-Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb from northern Mali, indeed,
have raised the profile of the Command’s military op63

erations, and could raise it further should the Special
Operations Command in particular play a public role.
It would be a mistake, however, to assert that AFRICOM had abandoned the “Plus” in CCMD Plus, as
there has been no fundamental shift in the Command’s
orientation since the arrival of its current Commander,
General Ham. In his November 21, 2012, presentation
at Chatham House in London, General Ham stated:
The priority tasks for—as outlined in the 2012 Defense
Strategic Guidance—tell us that countering al-Qaida
and violent extremists remain our highest priority,
and that’s understandable, I think, for a military organization. So those places in Africa where violent
extremism exists or seems to be emerging are the areas of highest priority. I mentioned Somalia and the
presence of al-Shabaab, Mali and the presence of AlQaida in the Islamic Maghreb, a growing network of
variously named organizations across North and West
Africa, and I would include in that Boko Haram and
their presence in Nigeria as an area of increasing focus.
. . . These are pressing and current issues, but we also
recognize that these are not challenges that can be addressed exclusively through military means. While
there may be a military component of a strategy to
address violent extremism, military action in and of
itself will not be successful. So what we really try to
do more broadly across the continent with a regional
focus is ensure that our military efforts are fully coordinated with a broader comprehensive strategy that
addresses the underlying issues of instability. And
those tend to focus on economic development, good
governance, education.

Perhaps there is an inevitable pendulum swing in
the life of any combatant command between steadystate engagement and military operations and that,
in 2011-2012, there was a pronounced swing at AFRI64

COM toward military operations. As the above quote
from General Ham indicates, however, the Command
recognizes that African security challenges cannot be
met long term by military means alone, but rather
through a fully coordinated, comprehensive U.S. Government interagency strategy for Africa that addresses
underlying, nonmilitary causes of instability.
If there has, in fact, been a swing toward military
operations at AFRICOM, General Ham’s quote also
implies that this swing has not been due to the Commander’s long-term intent, but rather reflects the contemporary, worsening security situation in some African countries. This security situation will hopefully
improve over time—and arguably it already has in
Somalia—thereby allowing a pendulum swing back at
AFRICOM toward its traditional, longer-term capacity building through steady-state engagement.146
Is AFRICOM about U.S. Access to Africa’s Energy
Resources?
The author argued above that one geostrategic
reason AFRICOM was created was Africa’s growing
economic importance in the world, both as a source
of strategic natural resources, including oil, gas, and
minerals, and as a market. Some critics of the Command—particularly in Africa—have repeatedly zeroed in on the energy aspect of U.S. interests in Africa
and asserted that AFRICOM’s central raison d’être
was to help the United States “seize” natural resources in Africa. Academics framed this school of thought
in terms of West African oil, but it applies equally to
natural resource extraction throughout the continent:
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Oil-related interventions since the end of the Cold
War have been conceptualized in certain strands of academic debate as instances of a “new oil imperialism,”
within which struggles over oil have the potential to
form a crucial axis of future Great Power conflict, especially between the U.S. and China.147

Why would some Africans and academics have
such perceptions? There is no doubt that Africa is
currently an important source of U.S. oil imports. By
2007, when AFRICOM was created, Angola and Nigeria had already become important suppliers of oil
to the United States, and projections pointed toward
the Gulf of Guinea region as a growing major source
of U.S. energy imports.148 One academic wrote in 2009
that considerable African oil:
will be destined for the U.S., with tankers loading
from offshore platforms and sailing directly across
the Atlantic to terminals on the U.S eastern seaboard. Strategically, this is of major importance to the
Americans since those shipments of crude are not
exposed to disruption in the way that supplies from
the volatile Middle East are. So improving maritime
security in the Gulf of Guinea, and other areas is of
supreme importance to the [United States].149

More recently, Dr. Peter Pham, a well-known Africa specialist at the Atlantic Council, wrote in July
2012 that:
The current [Obama] administration’s goal is to
“eliminate our current imports from the Middle East
and Venezuela within ten years.” . . . The gap . . . will
likely be made up by additional imports from Africa,
where proved petroleum reserves have increased by
40 percent in the decade in contrast to the downward
trends observed almost everywhere else.150
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At present, the Gulf of Guinea is not only a major
shipping route for global trade, but already the source
of 18 percent of U.S. oil imports and 14 percent of its
liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports. U.S. oil imports
from Africa were 20 percent of total imports in 2011151
and are expected to rise to 25 percent of total U.S. imports by 2015.152
Moreover, the economic importance of the U.S.Africa relationship will increase as more countries in
the sub-region discover oil and gas. In West Africa,
new offshore oil and gas fields have been discovered
recently in Ghana, Cote D’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sao Tome and Principe. Oil from the inland
country of Chad is transported to international markets via a pipeline that ends in Cameroon, on the Gulf
of Guinea, and there are prospects that oil discovered
in the inland nations of Niger and (potentially) the
Central African Republic would also be exported to
global markets in the same way. In East Africa, there
have also been recent oil and gas discoveries in Kenya,
Uganda, Tanzania, and Mozambique that also point
to the continent’s increasing importance for global energy security.153 Of course, most of this new oil will
be exported to third markets, not the United States,
but U.S. firms could also become involved as investors
or partners in aspects of African oil and gas exploration, drilling, and pipeline construction and operation
via various contractual, ownership, and productionsharing arrangements.
At the same time, it is important not to exaggerate
the direct importance of Africa as a source of oil and
gas for Washington. The use of new technologies such
as hydraulic fracking and horizontal drilling have
contributed to a new shale oil and gas boom in the
United States, reducing its dependence on imports.
According to the International Energy Agency’s an67

nual World Energy Outlook, U.S. oil production will
peak at 11.1 million barrels per day in 2020, compared
to 8.1 million barrels a day in 2011; U.S. oil imports are
forecasted to decline to 4 million barrels per day from
the current 10 million barrels per day. Since much of
U.S. imports will be from North American suppliers
Canada and Mexico, there will be a sharp drop in U.S.
imports from Africa, reducing the strategic importance
of Africa as an energy supplier to the United States.
Most importantly, however, just because U.S. oil
imports from Africa are increasing for now does not
mean that the United States is “seizing” this oil or that
AFRICOM is a tool to accomplish this. Where some
African (and non-African) observers err is in conflating interest by U.S. private-sector firms in the energy
sector on the one hand, with U.S. Government security cooperation in Africa on the other. AFRICOM’s
mission statement and Commander’s Intent in Box 3
are focused on human security, and nowhere mention
energy security.
If anything, AFRICOM is actually helping Africa maximize the benefit of its natural resources by:
1) programs to help African littoral states build capacity to better control their own territorial waters
and exclusive economic zones; and, 2) occasional innocent passage by U.S. naval vessels whose presence
reinforces U.S. policy in favor of unimpeded access
by boats and ships from all nations to international
waters around Africa. AFRICOM, mainly through its
Naval Forces Africa component, has been enabling
long-term capacity building of African navies through
its Africa Partnership Station program and joint exercises such as Saharan Express (north and west Africa),
Obangame Express (west and central Africa), as well
as joint training operations under the African Mari-
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time Law Enforcement Program (for example, to stop
illegal fishing and drug trafficking in West Africa).
The DoD and AFRICOM have also taken such steps as
selling an old Coast Guard cutter to Nigeria via DoD’s
Excess Defense Articles Program, helping Benin develop a national maritime strategy, and conducting
a table-top exercise with Ghana to assist that nation
in securing its new offshore oil platforms. The ships
of the U.S. Navy’s Sixth Fleet based in Naples, Italy,
regularly patrol in the Mediterranean above North
African territorial waters. The United States has also
contributed to international anti-piracy efforts in the
Horn of Africa along with several other nations.
For their part, U.S. energy producer and services
companies are independent actors beholden to their
global shareholders, not to AFRICOM or the U.S. Government. Far from “seizing” natural resources in Africa, these companies bring risk-capital, leading-edge
technology and decades of experience into voluntary,
arms-length transactions with African partners, in
fierce competition with international rivals. Even when
U.S. oil companies are active in Africa, either as equity
investors or as part of long-term production-sharing
agreements, they are generally outstanding corporate
citizens—not part of the stereotyped, all-powerful
“Seven Sisters” of the 1960s.154 U.S. oil companies,
like all U.S. firms, are constrained by strict anti-racketeering and anti-bribery laws in America, obliged to
follow Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) anti-corruption guidelines, and
are watched closely by shareholder activists and U.S.
civil society for their international compliance with
strict environmental and labor norms. Overall, the oil
firms are the best corporate citizens that African leaders and their publics could hope for.
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Finally, most of the oil imported by the United
States from Africa likely does not even involve U.S.
equity oil, but rather is purchased on the global oil
market from Africa parastatals, such as Sonangol in
Angola, or from an increasingly large constellation of
oil companies from Europe and developing countries,
including China, Brazil, and Malaysia, that operate in
Africa. Overall, this healthy global competition for African oil makes for more favorable terms of trade and
improved investment terms for African nations (unless their citizens are sold out by bribe-taking elites).
In short, the fact that the United States is a good
customer for African oil does not mean that Africa is
losing, but rather gaining. The United States is neither
“exploiting” Africa’s natural resources, nor has AFRICOM acted as an “instrument” to allow this. One
academic dismissed the “new oil imperialism” thesis
previously introduced by stating, correctly, the author
believes, that it:
overemphasizes potential strategic conflicts without
taking into account the ways in which the forms of
globalization promoted by Washington since 1945
have actually served to reduce interstate conflict.
Specifically, the US has long sought to ‘transnationalize’ economies in strategically important regions
of the globe, rather than pursue a more mercantilist
form of economic nationalism . . . thus embedding
them into the broader global economy, which in
turn opens them up to a broad array of investors on
a non-discriminatory basis. . . . This global corporate
presence in the region is fully aligned with U.S. interests: as long as the oil they produce is released onto
world markets, investment and production by Malaysian, British, and Chinese companies contribute as
much to U.S. energy security as do the activities of US
companies themselves.155
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Is AFRICOM Trying to Block China’s Rise
in Africa?
The above quote also responds convincingly to
another recurring critique of AFRICOM—including
one made interestingly by some Africans—that the
Command somehow wishes to “block” China’s rise
in Africa and prevent Beijing from helping itself and
its friends on the continent. One of the first questions
asked of then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(DASD) for Africa Policy Theresa Whelan, during a
briefing on the new Africa Command in 2007, was
“Why was China missing from her briefing?” DASD
Whelan responded:
It was missing for a reason, because this isn’t about
China. Everybody seems to want it to be about China
and maybe that is a little nostalgia for the Cold War, I
don’t know. But it isn’t about China. It is about U.S. security interests in Africa in the context of global security. China, yes, has become more engaged in Africa,
both—primarily for economic reasons.156

It is ironic that AFRICOM, far from being a U.S.
“tool” to keep China out of Africa, has actually facilitated China’s prosperous entry into African markets,
albeit in an indirect way. First, the assistance that AFRICOM brings to African militaries, including support for defense sector reform that aids the overall U.S.
Government effort to support security sector reform,
is helping countries on the continent to become more
stable, thereby fostering an environment conducive to
development and the very commercial opportunities
that Chinese companies and individuals are exploiting
successfully. Second, and as described above, AFRICOM is facilitating free access to the global commons,
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represented in this context primarily by the international waters around Africa, which benefits greatly
Chinese shippers. In short, AFRICOM indirectly aids
African development, much as the “Pax Americana”
fostered by the U.S. military engagement in the Pacific
has fostered stability and prosperity in East Asia since
the end of World War II.
Moreover, if AFRICOM was created to “block”
China from entering Africa, it has been a miserable
failure. China-Africa trade passed the $1 billion mark
in 1990, jumped to $10 billion in 2000, and accelerated
again, increasing 15-fold in a little over a decade to
$150 billion in 2011. China’s rapidly expanding ties
with Africa catapulted China past the United States in
2010 as Africa’s top trading partner.157 Ironically, it is
also China—much more than the United States—that
needs Africa as a source of oil to fuel its rapid industrialization and diversify supplies away from the volatile Middle East. One-third of its imports now come
from the continent, versus only 18-19 percent for the
United States.
At the end of the day, these critics of AFRICOM
should be more concerned about what China brings to
Africa, not what the United States brings. Aside from
China’s arms sales to nations such as Sudan, Western
donors are concerned that the Chinese government’s
“no strings attached” approach to development risks
undoing decades of Western efforts to promote good
governance, revenue transparency, and responsible
natural resource development in Africa; corrupts
African elites; unfairly promotes China’s interests at
the expense of other non-African nations by violating
OECD norms for aid and trade credits; free-rides on
Highly Indebted Poor Country debt relief; and risks
new unsustainable debts for African nations.158
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While China’s engagement with Africa has up to
now been primarily led by the Chinese government
and state-owned enterprises, nonstate actors, including privatized Chinese corporations and citizens, are
also increasingly important. These nonstate actors are
making a contribution to the diversity and depth of
Chinese trade and investment with Africa, but are also
aggravating a host of problems, including rampant
corruption, the flouting of labor and environmental
laws, and the sale of counterfeit goods. Large-scale
immigration by Chinese to Africa—by some estimates
totaling over one million persons—is creating tensions, particularly with African retail traders. Some
African politicians and the continent’s civil society
are starting to debate the costs and benefits of China’s
growing economic ties with the continent.159
Does France Support or Oppose AFRICOM?
Some French officials and academics were also
opposed to the creation of AFRICOM, which they
saw as risking the export of the war on terror to Africa. Other observers have asserted that, for decades,
France viewed its former colonies in Africa as an exclusive sphere of influence (pré carré). According to
one U.S. academic, France actively lobbied its Western
and Central African allies not to host AFRICOM headquarters and coordinated its efforts with the European
Union (EU).160 When Djibouti, a historical French ally,
allowed the United States to establish a permanent
base, some French viewed this decision the “new
Fashoda,”161 a historical reference to a UK military defeat of France in Africa. For some French, AFRICOM’s
creation as a sign that the era of exclusively French
military influence in many of its former colonies was
effectively over.162
73

Despite initial and perhaps visceral anti-American
reactions in France against AFRICOM’s creation, there
were already two important ongoing trends in Paris
that ultimately created a more favorable environment
for this U.S. Command:
1. Successive recent French administrations, including those of Nicholas Sarkozy (President from
May 2007 to May 2012) and the new French government of Francois Hollande, have stated publicly that
France had abandoned its past françafrique policies under which Paris propped up dubious African regimes.
Sarkozy, while campaigning for re-election in 2012,
said that françafrique had become burdensome and
that he wanted France to become more engaged in
emerging markets in Asia and Latin America, which
had greater potential for France’s economic future.
2. Budgetary concerns and a changing strategic climate have also pushed France toward a multilateral
approach. Structural changes in the armed forces—
abandonment of the draft, sharp reductions in the
size of the French military, and base closures between
1997 and 2002—have meant that France could no longer maintain the dominance it exercised in the 1960s
and 1970s.
France’s new military strategy in Africa, Andrew
Hanson wrote:
is one of ‘prevention and projection,’ which emphasizes using the smallest force possible, optimizing
use of military technology, prioritizing intelligence,
and pre-positioning forces in a region to respond
quickly to crises—all of which are reflected in current
African deployments.
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Rachel Utley, a lecturer at the University of Leeds,
has written that:
‘France is still keen to exercise a leading role [in Africa],’ says while offsetting the political, military, diplomatic, and financial costs of formerly national operations.” France’s remaining military presence in Africa,
in terms of both bases and peace-keeping operations,
are ‘in the process of being Europeanized,’ according
to Brigadier General Dominique Trinquand, as France
invites other European countries to commit forces to
the bases (bolding added).

In conclusion, while there may have been military
officials at France’s Ecole Militaire headquarters in
Paris who initially opposed AFRICOM’s creation in
2007, they are fewer now. The reality for France is that
budget cutbacks have forced it to reduce the size of
its forces in Africa in recent years—including the base
closure in Senegal announced in 2010. As the United
States has increased its presence, both in terms of temporary engagements with African militaries and in
terms of the opening and large expansion of its base in
Djibouti, French military planners increasingly have
recognized that AFRICOM’s presence can actually be
a huge boon for French interests.
In this regard, the March 2012 takeover of northern
Mali by AQIM and its Touareg allies may also mark
a watershed in a 180-degree turn in French attitudes
about the Command. France sees Mali not only as a
former colony, but as a nation so close to its own metropole that an al-Qaeda affiliate’s takeover of the northern half of Mali represents a clear and present danger
to the French homeland and Europe. In the UN, France
played a central role in a resolution that gave 45 days
to the Economic Community of West African States to
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come up with a credible intervention plan for northern
Mali. In December 2012, press reports had indicated
that France has been consulting with AFRICOM about
what military planners and intelligence it could provide to support this plan—and how the United States
could pay for it. As the Mali example suggests, France
was moving not only to burden-share by “Europeanizing” its security policy in Africa, but to “Americanize”
it as well, by welcoming AFRICOM’s increased role on
the continent and cutting back its own. France’s sudden decision to intervene militarily in Mali on January
11, 2013, only corroborates the above conclusion, as
it has since then pressed reluctant U.S. and European
allies to provide Mali with air transport, air refueling,
and intelligence support, while urging African troop
contributions from its ally, Chad, and countries in
West Africa.
PART V—THE FUTURE OF AFRICOM
In this concluding section, the author raises five issues important to AFRICOM’s future: allocated forces,
the selection of the Command’s partner-nations, the
desirability of regional approaches in Africa, the location of the Command’s headquarters, and the need for
a strategic right-sizing of the Command.
AFRICOM’s Allocated Forces Do Not Equal
Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy.
With budgetary constraints looming and global
priorities shifting, DoD recently published the 2012
Defense Strategic Guidance, under which each geographic combatant command would be allocated or
“aligned” an Army brigade to advise, train, and men-
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tor partner-nation security forces throughout their respective areas of responsibility.163 Not having aligned
forces has been problematic for the Command. In attempting to plan its security cooperation efforts, AFRICOM found itself caught in an endless bureaucratic
cycle of submitting requests for forces multiple times
per year, often with no certainty that they would be
provided.164
Because of this DoD initiative, AFRICOM will, for
the first time starting in March 2013, have allocated
forces that will deploy from bases in the continental
United States to Africa on a rotational basis. For AFRICOM, a dedicated Regionally Aligned Brigade would
expand on ongoing small-unit missions in Africa that
are already being conducted either under the operational control of Special Operations Command-Africa
or Marine Forces Africa. These include the Special
Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force of 200 Marines who are tasked to conduct theater security cooperation engagements and provide a limited crisis
response capability from Sigonella, Italy.
For several years, AFRICOM’s lack of allocated
forces and the fact that it had to compete with requests
for forces from other combatant commands hindered
its efforts to foster strong military-to-military relationships in Africa and expand partner capacity building
activities.165 In the future, the 2nd Brigade Combat
Team, 1st Infantry Division (2/1ID) out of Fort Riley,
Kansas, will be AFRICOM’s main go-to force provider
for security cooperation missions in Africa. Soldiers
within the 2/1ID, who were freed up following the
Iraq and Afghanistan drawdowns in the Central Command, will remain at home in Kansas for most of the
year they are aligned with AFRICOM. Teams that
go to Africa as part of the alignment would typically
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be small, with mission lengths measured in weeks
or months. During its first 6 months, 2/1ID is slated
to participate in 96 activities in 34 countries—nearly
two-thirds of the countries on the continent—and
will receive language training in French, Arabic,
and Swahili.166
What Americans might expect to be good news
for Africa—the assignment of a Regionally Aligned
Brigade to AFRICOM—could, instead, restoke fears
among some Africans of the militarization of U.S. foreign policy and a prelude to U.S. military interventions
on the continent. AFRICOM will have to socialize this
concept with African partners in the coming months,
explaining that the Brigade members will be present
as small teams working across the continent and will
not look much different than the way the Command
currently provides security assistance.
Alliances with Autocratic African Leaders
May be a Costly Error Later.
During the Cold War, the United States allied itself with several repressive, right wing governments
as part of its global struggle with the Soviet Union.
In Latin America, for example, it supported Chilean
dictator Augusto Pinochet and the Argentinean military regimes. Not only were such unholy alliances inconsistent with the democratic values that Americans
hold so dearly; they also exacerbated an anti-Americanism in Latin America that persists today. Similarly, perceived U.S. support for the apartheid regime
in South Africa, as well as opposition to liberation
movements in Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe in the
1960s to 1980s, left a legacy of strong anti-Americanism in several nations of southern Africa. This legacy,
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even today, has impeded and complicated U.S. efforts
to foster stronger and deeper security ties to major African nations such as South Africa and Angola.
Analogous to what happened during the Cold
War, the United States is partnering with repressive
regimes in Africa in the name of anti-terrorism and
stopping genocide, such as its backing of Uganda’s
support for the AU Mission in Somalia, Ethiopia’s
contributions to the UN Interim Security Force for
Abyei, and support of Rwanda’s troop contributions
to the UN-African Union Mission in Darfur. In the
early-1990s, the United States identified several socalled Renaissance leaders of Africa. They included
figures such as Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Meles
Zenawi of Ethiopia, and Paul Kagame of Rwanda,
whom the United States hoped would usher in a new
era of sound, democratic governance.167 What started
out well is going badly, as the United States has continued to support all three of these new leaders even as
they become increasingly autocratic. While the United
States did recently (and likely temporarily) distance
itself from President Kagame following a recent UN
report describing the collusion between the Rwandan
government and M-23 rebels who are destabilizing the
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, Washington has continued to embrace Uganda’s Museveni for
his troop contributions to the AU Mission in Somalia,
and for his cooperation in hunting Lord’s Resistance
Army leader Kony. As part of its efforts to support the
AU’s fight against al-Shabaab, the United States also
worked closely with Ethiopian long-time autocratic
leader Meles Zenawi who, during his 21-year rule, denied that country any chance to start to develop a real
democratic tradition.168
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Defenders of current U.S. policy might respond
with considerable validity that, up to now, the United
States has had to rely heavily on autocratic regimes
in Ethiopia, Uganda, and Rwanda because they contribute the bulk of, and some of the most capable,
troops to the AU Mission to Somalia and to the UNAU Mission in Darfur.169 Moreover, they might add
that both Missions were early 2007 “coalitions of the
willing” that predated the establishment of AFRICOM
(while the UN Interim Security Force in Abyei is a
newer creation).170
What can the United States do differently? Are
there really any alternatives to partnering with autocratic Africa leaders on peacekeeping? The answer, in
the short term, is no. For now, staying involved and
providing training to include International Military
Education and Training may help influence future
leaders to follow the rule of law better. However, over
the longer term, there is no force majeur reason—no
Cold War imperative—why the United States and
its Africa Command should feel compelled to work
so closely with African “big men.” While it will require patience and determination, the U.S. Government should try in the future—to the extent there
are potential troop-contributing countries for a given
mission—to give clearer priority to emerging democracies in Africa, such as the Benins of the continent, in
choosing future partner-nations for the training of African peacekeepers. As noted above, with the collapse
of the Soviet Union in early-1991, African countries
were freed from Cold War clientelism. These events
set off a multi-year wave of political liberalization that
started in 1990 with Benin’s national conference and
led to an increasing number of emerging democracies
on the continent. The United States needs to choose
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from this increasing universe of emerging African democracies for its peacekeeping training—a policy shift
that would also reinforce the principle of civilian-led
militaries in these new, democratic societies.
As a nation, we do Leahy vetting to ensure that
individuals who receive U.S. military training are not
past human rights violators.171 As a nation, we should
also try to be more selective in vetting nations that we
choose to train for AU and UN peacekeeping missions.
At the same time, however, the practical challenges
of finding suitable troop-contributing countries may
make this goal idealistic and elusive. African countries that are both emerging democracies and willing
and capable to contribute troops, even with additional
training, are relatively few. The U.S. political system
already prevents the U.S. Government from providing
peacekeeping training for the most egregious African
regimes, such as Eritrea or Zimbabwe. While training
peacekeepers for the AU Mission in Somalia from an
increasingly autocratic regime like that of Uganda is
not ideal, these peacekeepers have allowed the United
States to advance other important peace and security,
and counterterrorism goals on the rest of the continent. It is easy to imagine that without the participation (and sacrifices) of the Uganda People’s Defence
Force in Somalia, al-Shabaab would still be in charge
in Mogadishu today and represent a threat to the
U.S. homeland.
AFRICOM Strengthening Regional Approaches.
One way to alleviate African concerns about AFRICOM would be to further strengthen the Command’s
commitment to support regional approaches to Africa’s security problems. Recognizing this, AFRICOM
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has already expanded many of its programs and exercises to help the AU and five of its Regional Economic
Communities develop the AU’s African Peace and
Security Architecture.172 AFRICOM should continue
to increase training assistance on multilateral terms
through the African Standby Force and its five regional brigades, e.g., through battalion and brigade-level
exercises, command post exercises, and U.S.-supported peace training centers in each region.173 Consistent
with this, AFRICOM’s Commander told Congress in
February 2012 that the Command will:
Seek new ways to work with and through the African
Union and its regional organizations and to support
their leadership in preventing and responding to African security challenges.174

AFRICOM should also ensure stronger coordination with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York, working with and through the
DoS and the U.S. Mission to the UN, in order to avoid
duplication of effort with other donors and to provide
a coherent international plan for training and mobilizing African peacekeepers.
Where Should AFRICOM be Headquartered?
In events with African audiences and the African
press, the issue of the location of AFRICOM’s headquarters remains a perennial favorite. Since its inception, the question of AFRICOM’s headquarters has
been like a powerful two-sided magnet. On the one
side, AFRICOM was repulsive to many Africans, who
rejected having the Command on African soil for the
reasons noted previously. On the other side, members
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of the U.S. Congress covet the prestige, dollars, and
jobs that military basing brings. Several members, including those from South Carolina, Virginia, Georgia,
and Texas, have expressed the desire to have AFRICOM move to their districts.
Both to deflect African questions and Congressional pressure, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
indicated in 2007 that the “final” decision on AFRICOM’s location would be deferred for 5 years, until
2012. While the DoD has still not made this decision,
the then AFRICOM Commander, General Ham, did
confirm in September 2012 that the United States
would not, for the foreseeable future, establish the
headquarters of AFRICOM in any part of the African
continent, ostensibly due to the heavy financial cost of
doing so:
There have been some African countries that have
quietly made it known that should the United States
be willing to establish AFRICOM base in Africa they
might be willing to hand us a place. There are also other African countries who have made it known clearly
that they do not want AFRICOM to be based in their
country or the African continent. Today, the reality is
that we have found ourselves in a financial situation
that it will be too costly to situate our new headquarters anywhere on the continent of Africa.175

To some extent, the Commander’s financial explanation why AFRICOM would not be based in Africa is
partly disingenuous diplomacy. True, there would be
real and extremely high economic costs of establishing
and operating a combatant command staff headquarters in Africa. These include the enormous costs of
purchasing or leasing long-term offices, housing, and
security-related infrastructure to assure Western stan-
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dards of living and force protection, and the extremely high transportation costs of intra-African air travel
(which must often be accomplished by flying first to
Europe, and then back to the continent). However, the
reality is that for political reasons—and regardless of
cost—the United States could not place its staff headquarters for AFRICOM in Africa. To attempt to do so
would have created endless opposition from certain
African countries, including regional hegemons who
would perceive a permanent American military presence as an unwelcome incursion into their spheres
of influence. Not surprisingly, only smaller African
countries such as Liberia have shown any public enthusiasm for hosting AFRICOM, both for the economic benefits it would bring, and because they believe
that the United States could serve as a counterweight
to their own regional hegemon.
Will AFRICOM stay where it is, or move back to
the United States? For now, it is destined to remain
in the northern European city of Stuttgart, Germany,
which, The Economist amusingly pointed out, is several thousands of miles from Africa’s northern boundary along the Mediterranean Sea [and] “a sleepy and
dour town in Germany that is perhaps the least African place in the world.”176
Why stay put? Stuttgart, where the U.S. European Command still resides, is a logical place to keep
AFRICOM. While the costs of operating a combatant
command in Europe are enormous, the existing infrastructure for the Command is already there, and
millions of dollars (in admittedly sunk costs) have
already been spent to refurbish and improve Kelley
Barracks, where AFRICOM is located. Stuttgart also
has the advantage of being in the same time zone as
much of Africa, whereas a based located in the United
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States would have to address time zone differences
from Washington that, at various times of year due
to daylight savings time, range from 4 to 9 hours. Air
connections to Africa, via short stops in various European capitals, are excellent.
Consistent with this, Army General Martin
Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
told an AFRICOM audience in December 2012 that
he thought the Command should stay in Stuttgart
and that:
We think for operational reasons—unless there is a
huge (cost) disparity—operational reasons should
dominate [the debate about location].177

This being said, it may be worthwhile to shift
AFRICOM’s headquarters back to the United States
in the years to come. The tipping point may arrive as
intra-African air service improves in frequency and
safety, and as air connections between the U.S. East
Coast and various African capitals improve.
Why the Threat of U.S. Strategic Insolvency Means
AFRICOM Must Right-Size; and Why Intelligence
Expenditures and Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance Assets Merit Cost-Benefit Scrutiny.
An academic at the U.S. National War College,
Michael Mazarr, argued in the fall of 2012 that:
Throughout history, major powers have confronted
painful inflection points when their resources, their
national will, or the global geopolitical context no longer sustained their strategic postures” [and that] ‘the
post-war U.S. approach to strategy is rapidly becom-
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ing insolvent and unsustainable [and that insolvency]
will finally come true over the next five to ten years,
unless we adjust much more fundamentally.178

Mazarr sees the United States as an overextended
superpower, and likened the current U.S. position to
that of Great Britain in the 1890s—the world’s global
power at the time, but one that kept on making commitments overseas to the point that it simply could not
afford them any longer.179 At a time when the United
States is chronically running more than trillion dollar
annual budget deficits and when geopolitical changes
include the rise of China as an unpredictable global
partner and rival, there is a real risk for the United
States of “strategic insolvency.” In this context, every
part of the U.S. Government should be re-examined
and justified or cut back—including the $688.2 billion
in Pentagon budgetary outlays in Fiscal Year 2012.180
A June 2011 DoD report on the organizational
structure of combatant commands claimed that AFRICOM’s headquarters staffing was not sufficient
for full-time operational capacity during an extended crisis—and, by implication, that AFRICOM staff
should be increased. The report stated, for example,
that during Operation ODYSSEY DAWN in Libya,
AFRICOM’s headquarters was augmented by 90 personnel, and that additional personnel would have been
required to maintain continuous operations if Operation ODYSSEY DAWN had continued longer than it
did. 181 Mazarr might argue that the DoD’s June 2011
report was an example of the old way of doing business: more staff and a bigger budget as the “solution”
to every “problem,” instead of looking at “strategic
opportunity costs”(and recognizing that the budgetary and other) “factors closing down on the current
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paradigm are not merely momentary or reversible—
they are structural.”182
It is argued that AFRICOM was finally created in
2007 because the continent’s time of strategic importance to the United States had finally arrived. Ironically, the Command may also prove to be one of the
many commitments that the United States made but
could not really afford because its existing commitments—including a decade of wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq—were already so costly. The solution is also
not to close down AFRICOM, which costs a pittance
compared to the overall DoD budget, but to seek cost
savings to make the Command’s operations more efficient. One way to do this would be to undertake a
top-down right-sizing exercise, including a possible
reduction in its overall staffing. AFRICOM ‘s J-2 directorate, with a large staff spread between Stuttgart,
Molesworth, and Tampa, may be a Directorate that
could be scaled back. The DoS Bureau of Intelligence
and Research office following Africa has a staff of
only about 15 professionals, while AFRICOM’s J-2
staff numbers several hundred and does not include
analysts at the DIA in Washington who also cover
the continent.
AFRICOM’s Commander testified before Congress
in February 2012 that intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) assets:
are a key enabler for many of our operations and engagements [and that assets] based in Sigonella, Italy,
and Souda Bay, Greece, were used in Operation ODYSSEY DAWN and NATO Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR and continue to be used today to monitor illegal trafficking and violent extremist organizations.183
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While acknowledging the value of these assets, AFRICOM could also look closely at related programs to
see if they are cost-effective, including seeking lessons
learned from surveillance and reconnaissance efforts
earlier in the Command’s history that may not have
resulted in actionable intelligence. For example, The
Washington Post reported in June 2012 on two contractor-based Missions: “Creek Sand” in Mali, which was
reportedly aimed at AQIM and “Tusker Sand” in Central Africa, which reportedly aimed at locating Lord’s
Resistance Army leader Kony.184 In this regard, a senior AFRICOM official told the author that the Command had made adjustments in 2012 to rationalize its
ISR efforts.185 It is likely that AFRICOM-funded intelligence has been used effectively to assist France after
its January 11, 2013, decision to intervene militarily in
northern Mali against AQIM, but only an honest internal assessment can determine if overall AFRICOM
intelligence monies have been well spent.
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